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Independent Orbiter Assessment
Assessment of the Crew Equipment FMEA/CIL
I. 0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206. Instructions
for Preparation of FMEA and CIL. 3 November 1987. Chanue No. 4.
The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Crew Equipment
hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical
items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished
without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA
FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to
the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates
included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison
is provided through additional analysis as required. This report
documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter Crew
Equipment hardware.
The analysis was performed on only a subset of the crew
equipment. This subset was agreed upon during negotiation
between MDAC and the STS Orbiter and GFE Projects Offices. The
subset includes crew equipment which meets the following
criteria: (1) normally manifested on every flight; (2) has
received final design approval; and (3) is covered by a NASA
FMEA/CIL.
The IOA product for the Crew Equipment analysis consisted of 352
failure mode "worksheets" that resulted in 78 potential critical
items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline
(as of 1 January 1988) which consisted of 351 FMEAs and 82 CIL
items. The comparison determined if there were any results which
had been found by the IOA but were not in the NASA baseline.
Figure 1 presents a comparison of the proposed Post 51-L NASA
baseline, with the IOA recommended baseline, and any issues.
The issues arose due to differences between the NASA and IOA
FMEA/CIL preparation instructions. NASA had used an older ground
rules document which has since been superseded by the NSTS 22206
used by the IOA. After comparison, there were no discrepancies
found that were not already identified by NASA, and the remaining
issues may be attributed to differences in ground rules.
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2.0 INTRODUCTION
2.1 Purpose
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS office has
undertaken the task of re-evaluating the FMEA/CIL for the Space
Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent assessment
of the proposed Post 51-L Orbiter FMEA/CIL for completeness and
technical accuracy.
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
2.3 Analysis Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis
utilizing as-built drawings to breakdown the respective subsystem
into components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item
is evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These
data are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report,
and are used to assess the proposed Post 51-L NASA and Prime
Contractor FMEA/CIL. The IOA analysis approach is summarized in
the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the
assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL which is
documented in this report.
Step 1.0 Subsystem Familiarization
i.i Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific groundrules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
3
Step 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
2.4 Groundrules and Assumptions
The groundrules and assumptions used in the IOA are defined in
Appendix B. The subsystem specific groundrules were defined to
provide necessary additions and clarifications to the ground
rules and assumptions contained in NSTS 22206.
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3.0 SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION
3.1 Design and Function
The Crew Equipment consists of that hardware required for support
of crew activities during flight. It includes both IVA and EVA
support equipment.
3.2 Interfaces and Locations
The crew equipment items are located in both the crew compartment
and the payload bay.
3.3 Hierarchy
The overall hierarchy for crew equipment is shown in Figure 2.
Detailed breakdown are presented in Figures 3 through 12.
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Figure 29: Crew Equipment Hierarchy
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Figure 30: EMU Light Assembly Hierarchy
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Figure 32 : Payload Bay Door Tools Hierarchy
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Figure 35: IFM Breakout Box Hierarchy
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Figure 38: Orbiter Hardware Hierarchy
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4.0 ASSESSMENTRESULTS
The IOA analysis of the Crew Equipment hardware initially
generated 352 failure mode worksheets and identified 78 Potential
Critical Items (PCIs) before starting the assessment process. In
order to facilitate comparison, 78 additional failure mode
analysis worksheets were generated. These analysis results were
compared to the proposed NASA Post 51-L baseline of 351 FMEAs and
82 CIL items. The FMEAs that remained had minor discrepancies
that did not affect criticality.
A summary of the quantity of NASA FMEAs assessed, versus the
recommended IOA baseline, and any issues identified is presented
in Table I.
I Table I SUMMARY OF IOA FMEA ASSESSMENT I
I Component NASA IOA Issues I
+
EVA Equipment
EVA Tethers
EVA Tools
IVA Tools
Food Assemblies
Orbiter Hardware
TOTAL
66
33
88
19
Ii0
35
351
75
34
99
18
146
50
422
23
4
14
53
29
123
A summary of the quantity of NASA CIL items assessed, versus the
recommended IOA baseline, and any issues identified is presented
in Table II.
I Table II SUMMARY OF IOA CIL ASSESSMENT I
I Component NASA IOA Issues I
4 +
EVA Equipment
EVA Tethers
EVA Tools
IVA Tools
Food Assemblies
Orbiter Hardware
TOTAL
1
20
59
2
82
1
18
59
m
2
80
m
2
2
m
.b
m
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Appendix C presents the detailed assessment worksheets for each
failure mode identified and assessed. Appendix D highlights the
NASA Critical Items and corresponding IOA worksheet ID. Appendix
E contains IOA analysis worksheets supplementing previous
analysis results reported in Space Transportation System
Engineering and Operations Support (STSEOS) Working Paper No.
1.0-WP-VA87001-01, Analysis of the Crew Equipment Subsystem, 02
November 1987. Appendix F provides a cross reference between the
NASA FMEA and corresponding IOA worksheet(s). IOA
recommendations are also summarized.
Table III presents a summary of the IOA recommended failure
criticalities for the Post 51-L FMEAbaseline. Further
discussion of each of these subdivisions and the applicable
failure modes is provided in subsequent paragraphs.
I TABLE III
4
Criticality-.
SUMMARY OF IOA RECOMMENDED FAILURE CRITICALITIES
EVA Equipment
EVA Tethers
EVA Tools
IVA Tools
Food Assemblies
Orbiter Hardware
TOTAL
_IIIiI,
1/1
1
15
23
I
39
2/IR
m
3
34
I
2
39
i
I
I
I
I
3/IR
i
I
6
8
I
6
2O
3/2R
49
1
3
45
98
3/3
25
15
33
I0
i01
42
226
TOTAL
75
34
99
18
146
5O
422
+
I
+
Of the failure modes analyzed, 80 were determined to be critical
items. A summary of the IOA recommended critical items is
presented in Table IV.
I Table IV
+
Criticality:
SUMMARY OF IOA RECOMMENDED FAILURE CRITICALITIES
+ ..... 4 ...... 4
EVA Equipment
EVA Tethers
EVA Tools
IVA Tools
Food Assemblies
Orbiter Hardware
I/1
1
15
23
i
i
I
I 39
_-!1111°
TOTAL
2/IR
1
3
34
m
I
2
39
2/2
m
I
i
|
I
I
I
3/IR
2
I,
3/2R
m
3/3 1 TOTAL
- 1
- 18
- 59
- 2
- 80
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The scheme for assigning IOA assessment (Appendix C) and analysis
(Appendix E) worksheet numbers is shown in Table V.
Table V IOA WORKSHEET NUMBERS
Component
EVA Equipment
EVA Tethers
EVA Tools
IVA Tools
Food Assemblies
Orbiter Hardware
IOA ID Number
CRWEQP 1100-1499
CRWEQP 2100-2399
CRWEQP 3100-3899
CRWEQP 4100-4399
CRWEQP 5100-5499
CRWEQP 6100-6599
FMEAs'ADDED TO
ORIGINAL ANALYSIS
11100-11499
12100-12399
13100-13899
14100-14399
15100-15499
16100-16599
4.1 EVA Equipment Assessment Results
The IOA analysis identified five failure modes of the EVA
scissors. The NASA determined the EVA scissors were non-critical
items, so there were no FMEA/CILs available for comparison. The
assessment of the EMU light assembly generated eight new failure
modes. One of these failure modes (MDAC ID 11216) shows the
battery cell as a criticality 1/1 because of the possibility of
toxic venting or explosion. Three new FMEAs were generated for
the OBS. The IOA analysis of the OBS identified five failure
modes which were not considered by NASA. The failure modes were
not critical, but were included for completeness. The assessment
of the PFR generated one new FMEA, which was not critical.
4.2 EVA Tethers Assessment Results
The IOA disagrees with NASA's analysis of a hook failing to close
as criticality 1/1. The failure mode implies that the hook is
not in use, so its failure will not lead to an unrestrained
crewmember. The IOA differs with NASA on this issue for both the
ERCM safety tether and the waist tether. For all other failure
modes, MDAC either agrees with, or accepts NASA's analysis.
4.3 EVA Tools Assessment Results
The NASA analysis does not include a failure mode corresponding
to a failure of the three-point latch hook. This failure mode
should be added to the NASA's FMEA/CIL data base. The IOA
believes that NASA's analysis of the snatch block hook latch as a
criticality 2/1R is too high and should be lowered. If the hook
latch fails to close, then the tool is not in use at that time.
For the other EVA tools, the IOA either agrees with or accepts
NASA's results.
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4.4 IVA Tools Assessment Results
The FMEA/CIL assessment recommends deleting three FMEAs as being
non-credible failures (MDAC IDs 4200, 4307, 4310). With these
deletions, IOA agrees completely with NASA on the IVA tools that
were analyzed. All of the tools were found to be non-critical
primarily because of redundant hardware.
4.5 Food Assemblies Assessment Results
The IOA found that none of the hardware which had been analyzed
were critical hardware. IOA identified 35 FMEAs which were not
analyzed by NASA, and generated 44 new FMEAs to correspond to
failure modes NASA identified which had not been analyzed by IOA.
The slight differences in criticality ratings of FMEAs between
IOA and NASA is primarily due to differences in groundrules.
During the assessment process it was determined that five IOA
failure modes were non-credible and IOA recommends that these be
deleted.
4.6 Orbiter Hardware Assessment Results
The IOA found that none of the orbiter hardware, which had been
analyzed, were critical hardware. The assessment did generate
two new FMEAs for the treadmill and six new FMEAs for the COAS.
The assessment recommends accepting NASA's FMEAs and
criticalities for the mid-deck stowage lockers.
2O
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APPENDIX A
ACRONYMS
AOA
ASE
ATO
C&W
CIL
COAS
CWDA
dc
EMU
ERCM
EVA
F
F
FMEA
FSSR
GFE
GPC
HW
IFM
IMU
IOA
IUS
IVA
JSC
LED
MDAC
NA
NSTS
OBS
OWDA
PCI
PFR
PHS
PLBD
PRCBD
PRD
PSA
psi
QD
RHS
RMS
RTLS
- Abort-Once-Around
- Aerospace Support Equipment
- Abort-To-Orbit
- Caution and Warning
- Critical Items List
- Crew Optical Alignment Sight
- Contingency Water Dispenser Assembly
- Direct Current
- Extravehicular Mobility Unit
- Extended Range Crew Member
- Extravehicular Activity
- Fahrenheit
- Functional
- Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
- Flight Systems Software Requirements
- Government Furnished Equipment
- General Purpose Computer
- Hardware
- In-Flight Maintenance
- Inertial Measurement Unit
- Independent Orbiter Assessment
- Inertial Upper Stage
- Intravehicular Activity
- Johnson Space Center
- Light Emitting Diode
- McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
- Not Applicable
- National Space Transportation System
- Operational Bioinstrumentation System
- Operational Water Dispenser Assembly
- Potential Critical Item
- Portable Foot Restraint
- Personal Hygene Station
- Payload Bay Door
- Program Requirements Control Board Directive
- Payload Retention Device
- Provision Stowage Assembly
- Pounds per Square Inch
- Quick Disconnect
- Rehydration Station
- Remote Manipulator System
- Return-to-Launch Site
A-I
SFOM
SM
SOP
SSSH
STS
TAL
V
- Shuttle Flight Operations Manual
- Systems Management
- Secondary Oxygen Pack
- Space Shuttle Systems Handbook
- Space Transportation System
- Transatlantic Abort Landing
- Volt
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONSt GROUND RULEBe AND ABBUMPTIONS
B.I
B.2
B.3
Definitions
Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
Subsystem-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
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B.I Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206. Instructions _or P_ep_ation
of FMEA/CIL. i0 October 1986. chanae 4. 3 November _987,: were used
with the following amplifications and additions.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
to OPS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to oPS 9, post-flight
AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLYMISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
planned end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE (MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(oPs)
MC - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.)
B-2
MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or event of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OPS - software operational sequence
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up and ends at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LI_TOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transition out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at transition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and ends at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear
touchdown and ends with the completion of post-landing
safing operations
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B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Issusptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, Instructions for
PreParation of FMEA/CIL• I0 October 1986, chanqe 4, 3 November 1987
was employed with the following amplifications and additions•
Q
•
•
•
o
•
The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown.
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error
are out-of-scope of this task.
All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser.
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
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••
.
i0.
ii.
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest.
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis.
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22205 ground rule redirection.
Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project.
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B.3 Crew Equlpaent Specific Ground Rules and lssumptlons
The IOA analysis was performed to the component or assembly level
of the crew equipment subsystem. The analysis considered the
worst case effects of the hardware or functional failure on the
subsystem, mission, and crew and vehicle safety.
Ii Waist tether is used to fasten a crewmember to either a
workstation or to the ERCM safety tether. It is not
used to restrain tools.
RATIONALE: Worst case possibility.
• The Operational Bioinstrumentation System (OBS) will be
considered as a non-mandatory item for EVA operations.
Failure of the OBS while monitoring an IVA crewmember
can require the Flight Surgeon to terminate the mission.
Thus, IVA usage is more critical.
RATIONALE: IVA crewmembers are hooked to the OBS
only at the request of the Flight Surgeon.
If a crewmember's health cannot be
monitored, the Flight Surgeon has the option
of terminating the mission.
• Crew actions, planned and unplanned, are considered viable
alternatives for overcoming failures and reducing
criticalities.
RATIONALE: Crew equipment is designed to permit this
capability.
.
"Normally expected environmental conditions" precludes the
existence of contamination in all water lines.
RATIONALE: Interpretation and application of
redundancy screen C.
. Lockers are assumed to contain emergency, lifesaving, or IFM
critical equipment.
RATIONALE: Worst case possibility.
. Crew equipment failures discovered prior to launch will be
corrected prelaunch.
RATIONALE: Interpretation of flight rules.
7. RMS jettison is considered unlike redundancy to RMS stowing.
RATIONALE: Definition of redundancy.
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• The EMU lights are not designated as mandatory items during
EVA.
RATIONALE: Definition of mandatory versus
non-mandatory requirements.
o The failure of an EVA tether such that the crewmember is
unrestrained will be assigned a "1/1" criticality.
RATIONALE: Worst case possibility
i0. Certain galley and OWDA failures can result in free water in
the cabin. It is not a part of this task to identify the
hazards that free water can pose to other on-board systems.
RATIONALE: This should be addressed by a "hazard
analysis".
ii. Complete loss of the galley will not terminate a mission
as long as alternate water sources are available.
RATIONALE: The FDF contains procedures to bypass
the galley for water if required. Other
galley functions are not required for
completion of mission.
B-7

APPENDIX C
DETAILED ASSESSMENT
This section contains the IOA assessment worksheets generated
during the assessment of this subsystem. The information on
these worksheets facilitates the comparison of the NASA FMEA/CIL
(Pre and Post 51-L) to the IOA detailed analysis worksheets
included in Appendix E. Each of these worksheets identifies the
NASA FMEA being assessed, corresponding MDAC Analysis Worksheet
ID (Appendix E), hardware item, criticality, redundancy screens,
and recommendations. For each failure mode, the highest assessed
hardware and functional criticality is compared and discrepancies
noted as "N" in the compare row under the column where the
discrepancy occurred.
LEGEND FOR IOA ASSESSMENT WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
1R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission
Redundancy Screens A, B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
NASA Data :
Baseline
New
= NASA FMEA/CIL
= Baseline with Proposed Post 51-L Changes
CIL Item :
X = Included in CIL
Compare Row :
N = Non compare for that column (deviation)
C-I
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/10/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-II00
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
ii00
EVA SCISSORS - SPRING
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS ITEM WAS DETERMINED BY NASA TO BE NON-CRITICAL ITEM NOT
REQUIRING ANY FMEAs.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-2
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/10/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-II01
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
ii01
EVA SCISSORS - BLADE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[N] IN] IN]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS ITEM WAS DETERMINED BY NASA TO BE NON-CRITICAL ITEM NOT
REQUIRING ANY FMEAs.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-3
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/10/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-II02
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
1102
EVA SCISSORS - BLADES
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS ITEM WAS DETERMINED BY NASA TO BE NON-CRITICAL ITEM NOT
REQUIRING ANY FMEAs.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-4
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/10/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-II03
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
1103
EVA SCISSORS LOCKING BAR
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS ITEM WAS DETERMINED BY NASA TO BE NON-CRITICAL ITEM NOT
REQUIRING ANY FMEAs.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-5
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/10/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-II04
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
1104
EVA SCISSORS HINGE PIN
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS ITEM WAS DETERMINED BY NASA TO BE NON-CRITICAL ITEM NOT
REQUIRING ANY FMEAs.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-6
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-1200
NASA FMEA #: JSC22453-8B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
1200
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY - SEQUENCING CIRCUIT BATTERY
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
IN] IN]
C
[P]
[ ]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-7
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-1201
NASA FMEA #: JSC22453-8B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
1201
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY - SEQUENCING CIRCUIT THERMOSTAT
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-8
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-1202
NASA FMEA #: JSC22453-SA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
THERMOSTAT
CREW EQUIPMENT
1202
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY - SEQUENCING CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-9
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-1203
NASA FMEA #: JSC22453-8A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
1203
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY - SEQUENCING CIRCUIT SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
[3/2R] [P]
[3/3 ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMI_ :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-10
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-1204
NASA FMEA #: JSC22453-8B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
1204
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY - SEQUENCING CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
IN] IN]
C
[ P ]
[ ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-II
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/nmC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRWEQP-1205
JSC22453-7A
CREW EQUIPMENT
1205
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY - BULB
S.K. SINCLAIR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
IN] [N]
C
[p]
[ ]
IN]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [" ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-12
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-1206
NASA FMEA #: JSC22453-gA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
1206
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY-GIMBAL
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ]
C
[P]
[ ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-13
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-1207
NASA FMEA #: JSC22453-9A
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
1207
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY-GIMBAL
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA
IOA
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
CP] [ ]*
C ] [ ]
IN] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-14
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-1208
NASA FMEA #: JSC22453-9A
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
1208
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY-GIMBAL
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
NASA
IOA
[3/2R] [P]
[3/3 ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-15
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-1209
NASA FMEA #: JSC22453-10A
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CREW EQUIPMENT
1209
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY-HELMET LATCH
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 .] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE C / ] C ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ 3. [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-16
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-1210
NASA FMEA #: JSC22453-10A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
1210
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY-HELMET LATCH
LEAD ANALYST: S.K° SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
RE_:
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-17
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
CRWEQP-1211
JSC22453-10A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CREW EQUIPMENT
1211
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY-CROSS MEMBER
S.K. SINCLAIR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
A
]
]
]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-18
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-1212
NASA FMEA #: JSC22453-3A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
1212
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY-BATTERY
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COSPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
C
[p]
[ ]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
RE_:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-19
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
CRWEQP-1213
JSC22453-3A
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CREW EQUIPMENT
1213
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY BATTERY-INTERNAL FUSE
S.K. SINCLAIR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
C
[ P ]
[ ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-20
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-1214
NASA FMEA #: JSC22453-3A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
1214
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY - BATTERY CONTACTS
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
[3/2R] [P]
[3/3 ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ 3
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ 3 [ 3
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE :
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-21
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-1300
NASA FMEA #: OBS 2A
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
1300
OBS - SIGNAL CONDITIONER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NOTE: IOA CRITICALITY IS BEING MATCHED TO NASA's IVA CRITICALITY
INSTEAD OF NASA's EVA CRITICALITY. THE IVA ANALYSIS IS ASSUMED
TO REFLECT WORST CASE CONDITIONS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-22
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-1301
NASA FMEA #: OBS 2C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
1301
OBS - SIGNAL CONDITIONER - BATTERY
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CRITICALITY MATCHED TO NASAs IVA CRITICALITY TO REFLECT WORST
CASE ANALYSIS.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/11/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-13 OIA
NASA FMEA #: OBS 5A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
1301
OBS - SIGNAL CONDITIONER - BATTERY
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
COSPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS:
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/11/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-1302
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
1302
OBS - SIGNAL CONDITIONER - ON/OFF SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] [ ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO EQUIVALENT NASA FMEA. SHOULD BE ADDED FOR COMPLETENESS AND TO
COVER ALL POSSIBLE FAILURE MODES.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-25
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
CRWEQP-1303
OBS 2A
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CREW EQUIPMENT
1303
OBS - SIGNAL CONDITIONER - GAIN
S.K. SINCLAIR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ NA]
[ P ] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / 3. C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-26
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-1304
NASA FMEA #: OBS 3A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
1304
OBS - SIGNAL CONDITIONER - INPUT PORT
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/nmC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
RE_:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-27
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-1305
NASA FMEA #: OBS 3A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
1305
OBS - SIGNAL CONDITIONER - OUTPUT PORT
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
] *
]
COXPARE [ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FMEA 1305 IS MATCHED TO THE NASA FMEA FOR THE IVA CABLE DUE
TO A MATCHING OF THE CAUSE DESCRIPTIONS - BENT PINS IN EITHER THE
CABLE OR CABLE CONNECTOR.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-28
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/11/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-1306
NASA FMEA #: OBS 2A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
1306
OBS - SIGNAL CONDITIONER - ESP
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA FMEA 1306 IS MATCHED TO THE IVA CRITICALITY NUMBERS OF
THE NASA FMEA. IVA CRITICALITY REPRESENTS THE WORST CASE
ANALYSIS AND IS CONSISTENT WITH IOA GROUND RULES.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-29
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/11/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-1307
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
1307
OBS - BIOMED BELT
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] .
] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO EQUIVALENT NASA FMEA. NON-CRITICAL FAILURE SHOULD BE ADDED
FOR COMPLETENESS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-30
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/11/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-1308
NASA FMEA #: OBS IB
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CREW EQUIPMENT
1308
OBS - ELECTRODE HARNESS WIRES
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-31
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/11/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-1309
NASA FMEA #: OBS IA
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
1309
OBS - ELECTRODES
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
NASA
IOA
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
COHPARE [ / ] [ ] C ] C ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ]*
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-32
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/11/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-13 i0
NASA FMEA #: OBS IB
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
1310
OBS - ELECTRODE HARNESS
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ I ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ NA]
[ P ] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-33
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/11/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRWEQP-1311
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
CREW EQUIPMENT
1311
OBS - ELECTRODE HARNESS - PIN CONNECTOR/PINS
S.K. SINCLAIR
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IN] [N] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO EQUIVALENT NASA FMEA. SHOULD BE ADDED FOR COMPLETENESS AND TO
COVER ALL POSSIBLE FAILURE MODES.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-34
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/11/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-1312
NASA FMEA #: OBS 4A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
1312
OBS - EVA BIOMED CABLE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
]
]
]
B C
[ ] C ]
C ] C ]
C ] C ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-35
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/11/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-1313
NASA FMEA #: OBS 4B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
1313
OBS - EVA BIOMED CABLE - PINS/PIN CONNECTOR
LEAD ANALYST: S°K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-36
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/11/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-1314
NASA FMEA #: OBS 3A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
1314
OBS - IVA BIOMED CABLE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ NA]
[ P ] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMAR_ :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-37
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/11/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-1315
NASA FMEA #: OBS 3A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
1315
OBS - IVA BIOMED CABLE - PINS/PIN CONNECTOR
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-38
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/11/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-1316
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
1316
BIOMED CHANNEL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
RE_:
NO EQUIVALENT NASA FMEA.
ITEM AS A PART OF THE OBS.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
NASA ANALYSIS DID NOT CONSIDER THIS
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-39
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/11/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
CRWEQP-1317
CREW EQUIPMENT
1317
BIOMED CHANNEL SWITCH
S.K. SINCLAIR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
C ] [ ]
C ] C ]
C ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
RE_:
NO EQUIVALENT NASA FMEA.
INCLUDE THIS ITEM.
] C ] C ] . C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
THE NASA OBS SYSTEM DESCRIPTION DID NOT
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-40
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/11/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-1318
NASA FMEA #: OBS 3A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
1318
BIOMED PANEL CABLE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
C P ] [ NA]
C P ] [ NA]
C ] C ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-41
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/11/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-1319
NASA FMEA #: OBS 3A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW C x ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
1319
BIOMED PANEL CABLE - PINS/PIN CONNECTOR
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS-
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-42
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/11/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-1320
NASA FMEA #: OBS 3A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
1320
BIOMED PANEL CABLE - SHUTTLE INTERFACES
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-43
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-1400
NASA FMEA #: JSC22480-1A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ADJUSTMENT KNOB
CREW EQUIPMENT
1400
PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT PLATFORM ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-44
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-1401
NASA FMEA #: JSC22480-2A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LOCKING PLATES
CREW EQUIPMENT
1401
PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT PLATFORM ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-45
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-1402
NASA FMEA #: JSC22480-3A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BAR
CREW EQUIPMENT
1402
PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT PLATFORM ASSEMBLY TOE
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-46
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-1403
NASA FMEA #: JSC22480-4A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LOCK
CREW EQUIPMENT
1403
PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT PLATFORM ASSEMBLY HEEL
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[p]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-47
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-1404
NASA FMEA #: JSC22480-4B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LOCK
CREW EQUIPMENT
1404
PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT PLATFORM ASSEMBLY HEEL
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 12R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: _ (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-48
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-1410
NASA FMEA #: JSC22480-5A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT
MDAC ID: 1410
ITEM: PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT TELESCOPING BOOM
ASSEMBLY INBOARD CLAMP
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
CP]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS:
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-49
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-1411
NASA FMEA #: JSC22480-6A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT
MDAC ID: 1411
ITEM: PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT TELESCOPING BOOM
ASSEMBLY OUTBOARD CLAMP
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-50
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-1412
NASA FMEA #: JSC22480-7A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT
MDAC ID: 1412
ITEM: PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT TELESCOPING BOOM
ASSEMBLY PLATFORM CLAMP
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/nmC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-51
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-1413
NASA FMEA #: JSC22480-7B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT
MDAC ID: 1413
ITEM: PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT TELESCOPING BOOM
ASSEMBLY PLATFORM CLAMP
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONE: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
RE_"
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-52
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-1414
NASA FMEA #: JSC22480-8A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT
MDAC ID: 1414
ITEM: PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT TELESCOPING BOOM
ASSEMBLY QUICK RELEASE PIN
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 12R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-53
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 11/17/87
ASSESSMENTID: CRWEQP-1415
NASA FMEA #: JSC22480-8B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: CREWEQUIPMENT
MDAC ID: 1415
ITEM: PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT TELESCOPING BOOM
ASSEMBLY QUICK RELEASE PIN
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COSPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
RYe'-
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-54
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-1416
NASA FMEA #: JSC22480-9A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
N_ [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT
MDAC ID: 1416
ITEM: PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT TELESCOPING BOOM
ASSEMBLY INNER AND OUTER TUBES
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ 1 [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-55
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-1417
NASA FMEA #: JSC22480-10A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW C X ]
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT
MDAC ID: 1417
ITEM: PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT TELESCOPING BOOM
ASSEMBLY TORQUE LIMITER
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C 1
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-56
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-1418
NASA FMEA #: JSC22480-10B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT
MDAC ID: 1418
ITEM: PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT TELESCOPING BOOM
ASSEMBLY TORQUE LIMITER
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMA/_ :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-57
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-1420
NASA FMEA #: JSC22480-11A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT
MDAC ID: 1420
ITEM: PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT CENTERLINE CLAMP
ASSEMBLY QUICK RELEASE PIN
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-58
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-1421
NASA FMEA #: JSC22480-11B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT
MDAC ID: 1421
ITEM: PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT CENTERLINE CLAMP
ASSEMBLY QUICK RELEASE PIN
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) _
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-59
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-1422
NASA FMEA #: JSC22480-12A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT
MDAC ID: 1422
ITEM: PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT CENTERLINE CLAMP
ASSEMBLY ALIGNMENT TABS
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-60
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-1423
NASA FMEA #: JSC22480-13A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT
MDAC ID: 1423
ITEM: PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT CENTERLINE CLAMP
ASSEMBLY CAPTURE JAWS
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-61
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-1424
NASA FMEA #: JSC22480-14A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT
MDAC ID: 1424
ITEM: PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT CENTERLINE CI2LMP
ASSEMBLY CLAMP KNOB
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
CP]
CP]
C ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-62
C
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-1430
NASA FMEA #: JSC22480-15A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT
MDAC ID: 1430
ITEM: PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT ARTICULATING SOCKET
ASSEMBLY ADJUSTMENT KNOB
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/nmC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
cosP_ [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-63
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-1431
NASA FMEA #: JSC22480-17A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT
MDAC ID: 1431
ITEM: PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT ARTICULATING SOCKET
ASSEMBLY LOCKING PLATES
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-1432
NASA FIfE #: JSC22480-17A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT
MDAC ID: 1432
ITEM: PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT ARTICULATING SOCKET
ASSEMBLY QUICK RELEASE PIN
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/_NC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
CP]
[P]
C ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
RE_:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-65
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/18/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-2 i00
NASA FMEA # : 07-1B-SW2-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
2100
EVA SLIDEWIRE ASSEMBLY-SLIDE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] •
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS THE POSSIBILITY OF CONNECTING TETHERS
DIRECTLY TO THE SLIDEWIRE AND BYPASSING THE SLIDER. IOA AGREES
WITH THIS PROCEDURE AND RECOMMENDS CHANGING CRITICALITY TO NASA
3/3.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-66
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/18/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-2101
NASA FMEA #: 07-1B-SWI-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
2101
EVA SLIDEWIRE ASSEMBLY-SLIDE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /I ] [
IOA [ 1 /I ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
]
]
]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
ix]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/18/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/nmC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRWEQP-2102
07-1B-SW2-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CREW EQUIPMENT
2102
EVA SLIDEWIRE ASSEMBLY-SLIDE
S.K. SINCLAIR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
C
[ ]
[P]
IN]
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ NA]
IN] IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS THE POSSIBILITY OF HAVING THE CREWMEMBER
ATTACHTHE TETHER DIRECTLY TO THE SLIDEWIRE AND COMPLETELY
BYPASSING THE SLIDE(R). IOA AGREES WITH THIS PROCEDURE AND
RECOMMENDS CHANGING CRITS TO MATCH NASA.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-68
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-2103
NASA FMEA #: 07-1B-SW3-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
2103
EVA SLIDEWIRE ASSEMBLY-STOP
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] [P] [P]
C ] C ] C ]
[ N ] C N ] [ N ]
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA CONSIDERS THE STOP AS A REDUNDANT METHOD OF KEEPING THE EVA
CREWMEMBER ATTACHED TO THE SLIDEWIRE. IF THE STOP BREAKS FREE
AND THE SLIDEWIRE BREAKS OUT OF THE END FITTINGS, THEN THE
SLIDE(R) CAN BECOME LOOSE. THIS CAN RESULT IN AN UNRESTRAINED
CREWMAN. IOA AGREES WITH THIS ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDS CHANGING
THE CRITICALITIES TO MATCH NASA.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-69
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-2104
NASA FMEA #: 07-1B-SW6-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
2104
EVA SLIDEWIRE-END FITTINGS
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IX]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-70
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-2 I05
NASA FMEA #: 07-1B-SW6-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
2105
EVA SLIDEWIRE ASSEMBLY-COTTER PIN
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ x ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
COTTER PIN IS CONSIDERED PART OF THE SLIDEWIRE END FITTING.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-71
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-2106
NASA FMEA #: 07-1B-SWS-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
2106
EVA SLIDEWIRE ASSEMBLY - QUICK DISCONNECT PIN
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA CONSIDERED THE ENTIRE DEPLOYMENT LINKAGE AND YOKE ASSEMBLY
AS ONE ENTITY, WITH NO REDUNDANCIES. UNDER THIS ASSUMPTION, IOA
AGREES WITH THE NASA CRITS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-72
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-2107
NASA FMEA #: 07-1B-SW5-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
2107
EVA SLIDEWIRE ASSEMBLY - QUICK DISCONNECT PIN
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IN] [N] IN]
[ X ] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA CONSIDERED THE ENTIRE DEPLOYMENT YOKE AND LINK AS ONE
ENTITY. CONSIDERATION WAS NOT GIVEN TO CREW ACTIONS IN CLEARING
THE JAM BY ALTERNATE METHODS. WITH THESE TWO ASSUMPTIONS, IOA
AGREES WITH THE NASA CRITICALITIES.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-73
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRWEQP-2108
07-1B-SW5-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CREW EQUIPMENT
2108
EVA SLIDEWIRE ASSEMBLY-SUPPORT STRUCTURE
S.K. SINCLAIR
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
C N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA CONSIDERED THE ENTIRE DEPLOYMENT LINK/YOKE ASSEMBLY AS ONE
ENTITY. NO CONSIDERATION IS GIVEN TO CREW ACTIONS IN REDUCING
THE CRITICALITY AND SOLVING THE PROBLEM. UNDER THESE TWO
ASSUMPTIONS, IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA CRITICALITIES.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-74
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-2109
NASA FMEA #: 07-1B-SWI-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
2109
EVA SLIDEWIRE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/18/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-2200
NASA FMEA #: JSCI7067B-IA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
HOOK
CREW EQUIPMENT
2200
EXTENDED RANGE CREWMEMBER SAFETY TETHER-SMALL
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /1 ] C ] C ] C ]
IOA C 1 /i ] C ] C ] C ]
[ x] *
IX]
COHPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IX]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/18/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-2201
NASA FMEA #: JSCI7067B-IA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
HOOK
CREW EQUIPMENT
2201
EXTENDED RANGE CREWMEMBER SAFETY TETHER-SMALL
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [s ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA HAS LUMPED THE FAILURE TO CLOSE INTO THE "HOOK BREAKS
OR JAMS OPEN" FAILURE. THIS IS AN INAPPROPRIATE GROUPING SINCE
JAMMING OPEN (OR FAILING TO CLOSE) IMPLIES THE HOOK IS NOT IN USE
WHEN THE FAILURE OCCURS. FAILURE TO BE ABLE TO USE THE
HOOK SHOULD NOT BE A i/I, AND THE FMEA WILL BE DISCUSSED WITH THE
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-77
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/18/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-2202
NASA FMEA #: JSCI7067B-IE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
HOOK
CREW EQUIPMENT
2202
EXTENDED RANGE CREWMEMBER SAFETY TETHER-SMALL
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] •
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-78
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/18/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRWEQP-2203
JSCIT0671B-IA
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CREW EQUIPMENT
2203
EXTENDED RANGE CREWMEMBER SAFETY TETHER-CABLE
S.K. SINCLAIR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
RY__:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-79
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/18/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-2204
NASA FMEA #: JSCI7067B-IA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
2204
ERCM SAFETY TETHER-CABLE ATTACH POINTS
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] C ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] C ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
R_:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-80
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 11/18/87
ASSESSMENTID: CRWEQP-2205
NASA FMEA #: JSCI7067-1A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
N_ [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CASE
CREW EQUIPMENT
2205
EXTENDED RANGE CREWMEMBER SAFETY TETHER-REEL
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
REDUNDANCY SCREENSCRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-81
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/18/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-2206
NASA FMEA #: JSCI7067B-IB
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/nmc
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CREW EQUIPMENT
2206
ERCM SAFETY TETHER-CABLE TAKE UP ASSEMBLY
S.K. SINCLAIR
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE C / ] C
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
]
]
3
B C
C ] [ ]
[ ] C ]
C ] C ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-82
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/18/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA
IOA
CRWEQP-2207
JSCI7067B-ID
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CREW EQUIPMENT
2207
ERCM SAFETY TETHER-CABLE TAKE UP ASSEMBLY
S.K. SINCLAIR
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[a/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]*
[3/3 3 [ ] [ ] [ 3 [ 3
COSPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ 3 [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-83
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/18/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRWEQP-2208
JSCI7067B-ID
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CREW EQUIPMENT
2208
ERCM SAFETY TETHER-CABLE TAKE UP ASSEMBLY
S.K. SINCLAIR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
[ ] C ]
C ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-84
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/18/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-2209
NASA FMEA #: JSCI7067B-1D
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
_DW/_JNc
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CREW EQUIPMENT
2209
ERCM SAFETY TETHER-CABLE TAKE UP ASSEMBLY
S.K. SINCLAIR
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
]
]
]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] ' [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
R_:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-85
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/18/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-22 i0
NASA FMEA #: JSCI7067B-ID
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
2210
ERCM SAFETY TETHER-LOCK/UNLOCK SELECTOR SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C I ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS:
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-86
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 11/18/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-2211
NASA FMEA #: JSCI7067B-ID
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
2211
ERCM SAFETY TETHER-LOCK/UNLOCK SELECTOR SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-87
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/18/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-2212
NASA FMEA #: JSCI7067B-IA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
2212
ERCM SAFETY TETHER-"D" RING
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] C ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-88
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/18/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-2213
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
2213
ERCM SAFETY TETHER-"D" RING
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO CORRESPONDING NASA FMEA. 3/3 IS A NON-CRITICAL FAILURE, BUT
IT SHOULD BE ADDED TO THE NASA DATA BASE FOR PURPOSES OF
COMPLETENESS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-89
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/18/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM :
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
CRWEQP-2300
JSCI7067B-2A
CREW EQUIPMENT
2300
WAIST TETHER-HOOKS
S.K. SINCLAIR
NASA [ 1 /i ] [
IOA [ 1 /i ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
]
]
]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-90
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/18/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-2301
NASA FMEA #: JSCI7067B-2A
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
2301
WAIST TETHER-HOOKS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE IS UNDER NASA FMEA FAILURE "EITHER HOOK LATCH JAMS
OPEN". MDAC FMEA CALLS "FAILS TO CLOSE" A NON-CRITICAL FAILURE
SINCE TETHER IS NOT IN USE AT TIME OF FAILURE. FMEA WILL BE
DISCUSSED WITH NASA SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-91
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/18/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-2302
NASA FMEA #: JSCI7067B-2B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
2302
WAIST TETHER-HOOKS
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-92
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/18/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-2302A
NASA FMEA #: JSCI7067B-2C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
2302
WAIST TETHER-HOOKS
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
]
]
]
B C
[ ] C ]
C ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] .[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-93
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/18/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-2303
NASA FMEA #: JSCI7067B-2A
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
2303
WAIST TETHER-HOOKS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ /. ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-94
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/18/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-2304
NASA FMEA #: JSCI7067B-2A
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
2304
WAIST TETHER-NOMEX WEBBING
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
] [x]*
] IX]
COMPARE C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ 3
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
RE_"
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-95
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/18/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-2305
NASA FMEA #: JSCI7067B-2A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
2305
WAIST TETHER-NOMEX WEBBING
LEAD ANAL¥ST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMA_ :
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-96
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/18/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-2306
NASA FMEA #: JSCI7067B-2A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
2306
WAIST TETHER-NOMEX WEBBING
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 1 /I ] C ] C ] C
IOA C 1 /I ] [ ] C ] C
[ x ] *
ix]
COMPARE C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-97
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/30/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3100
NASA FMEA #: TUBE CUTTER 6G
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3100
TUBE CUTTER CUTTING WHEEL
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] C ] C ]
[ x] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS :
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-98
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/30/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3101
NASA FMEA #: TUBE CUTTER 6I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3101
TUBE CUTTER CUTTING WHEEL
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] C ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
IX] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-99
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/30/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3102
NASA FMEA #: TUBE CUTTER 6A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3102
TUBE CUTTER CUTTING WHEEL SLIDE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] C ] C ]
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-100
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/30/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3 I03
NASA FMEA #: TUBE CUTTER 6F
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ASSEMBLY
CREW EQUIPMENT
3103
TUBE CUTTER RATCHET WHEEL (ON SMALL RATCHET)
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-101
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/30/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3104
NASA FMEA #: TUBE CUTTER 6D
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
SELECTION TAB
CREW EQUIPMENT
3104
TUBE CUTTER SMALL RATCHET ASSEMBLY DIRECTION
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-102
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/02/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3 i05
NASA FMEA #: TUBE CUTTER 6D
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
SELECTION TAB
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COSPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CREW EQUIPMENT
3105
TUBE CUTTER SMALL RATCHET ASSEMBLY DIRECTION
L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ]. [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-I03
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/02/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3106
NASA FMEA #: TUBE CUTTER 6C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3106
TUBE CUTTER PAWL
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMA_ :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-I04
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/02/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3107
NASA FMEA #: TUBE CUTTER 6J
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3107
TUBE CUTTER PAWL
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, So SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-I05
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/02/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3108
NASA FMEA #: TUBE CUTTER 6K
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ROLLER LINK)
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CREW EQUIPMENT
3108
TUBE CUTTER SPRING-ASSISTED RETENTION ROLLER (ON
L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
]
]
]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-106
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/02/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3109
NASA FMEA #: TUBE CUTTER 6L
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3109
TUBE CUTTER ROLLER LINK
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-I07
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/02/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3110
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3110
TUBE CUTTER IDLER ROLLER
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] •
] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO EQUIVALENT NASA FMEA. IT SHOULD BE ADDED FOR PURPOSES OF
COMPLETENESS AND WILL BE DISCUSSED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER EVEN
THOUGH THIS IS A NON-CRITICAL FAILURE.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-I08
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/02/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
CRWEQP-3111
TUBE CUTTER 6B
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CREW EQUIPMENT
3111
TUBE CUTTER LARGE RATCHET HANDLE
L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[x]*
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-I09
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/02/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3112
NASA FMEA #: TUBE CUTTER 6B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3112
TUBE CUTTER SMALL RATCHET HANDLE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-II0
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/02/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3113
NASA FMEA #: TUBE CUTTER 6E
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CREW EQUIPMENT
3113
TUBE CUTTER SOFT-TIP SET SCREW
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-Ill
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/24/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3200
NASA FMEA #: CENTERLINE LATCH 4E
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3200
CENTERLINE LATCH BYPASS TOOL SAFETY RELEASE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, So SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-I12
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/24/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3201
NASA FMEA #: CENTERLINE LATCH 4D
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CREW EQUIPMENT
3201
CENTERLINE LATCH BYPASS TOOL LATCH
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
RF_:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-I13
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/24/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3202
NASA FMEA #: CENTERLINE LATCH 4A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3202
CENTERLINE LATCH BYPASS TOOL LATCH
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
[1/1] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ 3 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ p ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
IX]*
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C I/i ] C ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA ASSESSMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE02/12/88 C-I14
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/24/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3203
NASA FMEA #: CENTERLINE LATCH 4C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3203
CENTERLINE LATCH BYPASS TOOL LATCH
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [
IOA [ 1 /I ] [
] [ ] [x]
] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
Ix]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C 3. C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-115
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/24/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3204
NASA FMEA #: CENTERLINE LATCH 4F
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CREW EQUIPMENT
3204
CENTERLINE LATCH BYPASS TOOL RATCHET WHEEL
L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
NASA [ 1 /i ] [
IOA [ 1 /i ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
]
]
]
B C
[ ] C ]
[ ] C ]
C ] C ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
RE_:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-I16
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/24/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3205
NASA FMEA #: CENTERLINE LATCH 4E
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CREW EQUIPMENT
3205
CENTERLINE LATCH BYPASS TOOL RELEASE TRIGGER
L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-I17
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/24/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3206
NASA FMEA #: CENTERLINE LATCH 4B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3206
CENTERLINE LATCH BYPASS TOOL RATCHET HANDLE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-I18
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/24/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3207
NASA FMEA #: CENTERLINE LATCH 4D
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CREW EQUIPMENT
3207
CENTERLINE LATCH BYPASS TOOL RELEASE CATCH
L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] C ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-119
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/24/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3208
NASA FMEA #: CENTERLINE LATCH 4D
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3208
CENTERLINE LATCH BYPASS TOOL SAFETY RELEASE TAB
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-120
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/24/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3300
NASA FMEA #: 3-POINT LATCH 5B
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CREW EQUIPMENT
3300
3-POINT LATCH TOOL RATCHET HANDLE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ _ [ J
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
IX] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-121
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/02/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3301
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3301
3-POINT LATCH TOOL HOOK
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [
CO,mARE C N /N ] [ ] [ ] [
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] •
] IX]
] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C 1 /i ] C ] [ ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS:
NO EQUIVALENT NASA FMEA.
] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
SHOULD BE ADDED TO NASA DATA BASE.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-122
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/24/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3302
NASA FMEA #: 3-POINT LATCH 5A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3302
3-POINT LATCH TOOL RATCHET WHEEL SELECTOR TAB
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ i/i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-123
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/24/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3303
NASA FMEA #: CENTERLINE LATCH 5A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3303
3-POINT LATCH TOOL RATCHET WHEEL SELECTOR TAB
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ i/i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ 1 [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-124
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/24/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3304
NASA FMEA #: CENTERLINE LATCH 5C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3304
3-POINT LATCH TOOL RATCHET WHEEL
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA. [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-125
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/02/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3305
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LATCH
CREW EQUIPMENT
3305
3-POINT LATCH TOOL ROLLER SHOE RELEASE HANDLE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO EQUIVALENT NASA FMEA BUT SHOULD BE ADDED FOR PURPOSES OF
COMPLETENESS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-126
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/24/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRWEQP-3306
CENTERLINE LATCH 5D
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CREW EQUIPMENT
3306
3-POINT LATCH TOOL ROLLER SHOE RELEASE HANDLE
L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-127
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/02/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3307
NASA FMEA #: 3-POINT LATCH 5F
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3307
3-POINT LATCH TOOL COMPENSATOR ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[. / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-128
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/02/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
CRWEQP-3308
3-POINT LATCH 5E
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CREW EQUIPMENT
3308
3-POINT LATCH TOOL ROLLER SHOE ASSEMBLY
L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
NASA [ 1 /i ] [
IOA [ 1 /I ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
]
]
]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-129
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3400
NASA FMEA #: EVA WINCH 3A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3400
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY HOOK
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
ix]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-130
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3401
NASA FMEA #: EVA WINCH 3G
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTROL LEVER
CREW EQUIPMENT
3401
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY RATCHET HANDLE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] CP]
C ] C ]
C
[ P ]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-131
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3402
NASA FMEA #: EVA WINCH 3F
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTROL LEVER
CREW EQUIPMENT
3402
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY RATCHET HANDLE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FOR PURPOSES OF THIS FMEA, THE RATCHET HANDLE CONTROL LEVER CAN
BE CONSIDERED AS A PART OF THE RATCHET ASSEMBLY.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-132
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3403
NASA FMEA #: EVA WINCH 3E
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
HANDLE
CREW EQUIPMENT
3403
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY LARGE CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
[P] [P] CX]*
[p] [P] [x]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-133
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3404
NASA FMEA #: EVA WINCH 3F
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
HANDLE
CREW EQUIPMENT
3404
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY LARGE CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-134
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3405
NASA FMEA #: EVA WINCH 3E
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3405
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT RATCHET HANDLE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-135
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3406
NASA FMEA #: EVA WINCH 3C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3406
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY ROPE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 2 /IR ] [ P ] C P ] [ P ]
IOA C 2 /IR ] [ P ] C P ] C P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[X]*
Ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-136
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/nmC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
CRWEQP-3407
EVA WINCH 3B
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CREW EQUIPMENT
3407
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY ROPE
L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] C P ]
CP] CP]
C ] C ]
c
CP]
CP]
C ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-137
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: ii/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
CRWEQP-3408
EVA WINCH 3I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CREW EQUIPMENT
3408
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY TORQUE LIMITER
L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
]
]
]
B C
C ] [ ]
[ ] C ]
C ] C ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ 1 [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
RE_:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-138
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3409
NASA FMEA #: EVA WINCH 3F
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3409
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY RATCHET WHEEL
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/nmC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] C P ]
CP] [P]
C ] [ ]
c
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS :
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]'
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-139
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3410
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3410
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY ROPE ROLLER
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [
3 C ] C ] C ] *
] C ] C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REM_-
] C 3
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
NO EQUIVALENT NASA FMEA BUT IT SHOULD BE ADDED FOR PURPOSES OF
COMPLETENESS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-140
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3411
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CREW EQUIPMENT
3411
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY ROPE ROLLER
L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/nmC A B C
C ] C ]
[ 3 C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
•(ADD/DE LETE )
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO EQUIVALENT NASA FMEA BUT IT SHOULD BE ADDED FOR PURPOSES OF
COMPLETENESS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-141
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3412
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3412
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY HANDLE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO EQUIVALENT NASA FMEA BUT IT SHOULD BE ADDED FOR PURPOSES OF
COMPLETENESS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-142
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3413
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ASSEMBLY
CREW EQUIPMENT
3413
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY MOUNTING PLATE
LEAD ANALYST : L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO EQUIVALENT NASA FMEA BUT IT SHOULD BE ADDED FOR PURPOSES OF
COMPLETENESS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-143
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3414
NASA FMEA #: EVA WINCH 3H
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3414
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY GEARS
LEAD ANALYST : L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x] *
IX]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C I" ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-144
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 11/22/87
ASSESSMENTID: CRWEQP-3415
NASA FMEA #: EVA WINCH 2D
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CREW EQUIPMENT
3415
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY GEARS
L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[X] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-145
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3416
NASA FMEA #: EVA WINCH 30
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW C x ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3416
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY PIP PIN
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-146
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3417
NASA FMEA #: EVA WINCH 3C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3417
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY ROPE SPOOL
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [. ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE MECHANICAL MALFUNCTION CAUSE OF THE NASA FMEA 3C WILL BE DUE
TO A MALFUNCTION IN THE ROPE STOOL. THEREFORE, THIS FMEA IS PART
OF NASA 3C.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-147
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3500
NASA FMEA #: WINCH ADAPTER IC
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ x ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3500
EVA WINCH ADAPTER ASSEMBLY ROPE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-148
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3501
NASA FMEA#: WINCH ADAPTER IA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3501
EVA WINCH ADAPTER ASSEMBLY ROPE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT-.
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REM_:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-149
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3502
NASA FMEA #: WINCH ADAPTER ID
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3502
EVA WINCH ADAPTER ASSEMBLY HOOK
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
RE_:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-150
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3503
NASA FMEA #: WINCH ADAPTER IE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3503
EVA WINCH ADAPTER ASSEMBLY HOOK LATCH
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-151
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3503A
NASA FMEA #: WINCH ADAPTER IF
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3503
EVA WINCH ADAPTER ASSEMBLY HOOK LATCH
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT-.
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / 3 [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ 3 [ ] [ ] [ 3
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS-
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-152
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3504
NASA FMEA #: WINCH ADAPTER 1B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3504
EVA WINCH ADAPTER ASSEMBLY ROPE CAM CLEAT
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-153
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3505
NASA FMEA #: WINCH ADAPTER IA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3505
EVA WINCHADAPTER ASSEMBLY ROPE CAM CLEAT
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
ix]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-154
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/nmC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
CRWEQP-3506
WINCH ADAPTER IG
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CREW EQUIPMENT
3506
EVA WINCH ADAPTER ASSEMBLY ROPE GUIDE PLATE
L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] CP]
[P] CP]
C ] C ]
c
[p]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-155
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3507
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3507
EVA WINCH ADAPTER ASSEMBLY ROPE ROLLER
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
r / r c 1
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE:
REMA_ :
NO EQUIVALENT NASA FMEA.
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
3/3 RANKING IS A NON-CRITICAL FAILURE,
BUT IT SHOULD BE ADDED TO THE NASA DATA BASE FOR COMPLETENESS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-156
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3508
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3508
EVA WINCH ADAPTER ASSEMBLY ROPE ROLLER
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ /. ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO EQUIVALENT NASA FMEA. FAILURE IS A NON-CRITICAL FAILURE BUT
SHOULD BE ADDED TO THE NASA DATA BASE FOR COMPLETENESS.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3509
NASA FMEA # : WINCH ADAPTER IA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3509
EVA WINCH ADAPTER ASSEMBLY ROPE SPOOL
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/nmC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[x]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-158
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/14/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3600
NASA FMEA #: PRD-5B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3600
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE ASSEMBLY RATCHET HANDLE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA CRITICALIIES. TWO DEVICES ARE FLOWN ON
EVERY FLIGHT PLUS RMS JETTISON CAPABILITY MUST BE CONSIDERED
AVAILABLE GIVING A HARDWARE CRITICALITY OF "3" INSTEAD OF "2".
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY HOWEVER, CAN RESULT IN A LOSS OF CREW
AND/OR VEHICLE.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-159
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/14/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA # :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA DATA:
CRWEQP-3601 BASELINE [ ]
PRD-2 NEW [ X ]
CREW EQUIPMENT
3601
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE ASSEMBLY HOOK
L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
NASA [ 1 /i ] [
IOA [ 1 /i ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
]
]
]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] C ]
C ] C ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
RE_:
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-160
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/14/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3602
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3602
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE ASSEMBLY HOOK LATCH
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPON CLOSER EXMANITAION, IOA FEELS THAT A STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF
THE HOOK LATCH IS A NON-CREDIBLE FAILURE AND SHOULD BE ELIMINATED
FROM FURTHER CONSIDERATION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/14/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3603
NASA FMEA #: PRD-3A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3603
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE ASSEMBLY HOOK LATCH
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
NASA
IOA
[3/3 ] [ ]
[2/IR] [P]
[ ] [ ] [
[ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]_
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISAGREE WITH NASA CRITICALITY AND MODIFY ORIGINAL IOA
CRITICALITY. LATCH HOOK FAILING TO CLOSE WILL CAUSE LOSS OF HOOK
FUNCTION. HOWEVER, TWO DEVICES ARE FLOWN ON EACH FLIGHT PLUS RMS
JETTISON IS STILL AVAILABLE. SINCE THIS TOOL ISUSED ONLY AS AN
RMS TIE DOWN DEVICE, THERE ARE SUFFICIENT REDUNDANCIES TO LOWER
HARDWARE CRITICALITY TO A "3". THE FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY
REMAINS A IR SINCE LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAN RESULT IN THE LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3604
NASA FMEA #: PRD-SA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3604
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE ASSEMBLY RATCHET GEAR
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3605
NASA FMEA #: PRD-5A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3605
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE ASSEMBLY RATCHET GEAR
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ I/i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[, / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3606
NASA FMEA #: PRD-IA
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
STRAP
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CREW EQUIPMENT
3606
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE ASSEMBLY KEVLAR WEB
L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
NASA [ 1 /i ] [
IOA [ 1 /I ] [
COSPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
]
]
]
B C
C ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMA/tKS :
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3606A
NASA FMEA #: PRD-IB
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
STRAP
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CREW EQUIPMENT
3606
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE ASSEMBLY KEVLAR WEB
L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA C 1 /I ] C ] [ ] [ ] C x ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEAs SPLIT THE ANALYSIS FOR THE KEVLAR STRAPS INTO ONE FOR
THE LONG STRAP AND ONE FOR THE SHORT STRAP.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3607
NASA FMEA #: PRD-7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
HANDLE ASSEMBLY
CREW EQUIPMENT
3607
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE ASSEMBLY REACTION
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3608
NASA FMEA #: PRD-SA
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PIN
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
CREW EQUIPMENT
3608
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE ASSEMBLY RATCHET SHAFT
L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SCREENS ARE NOT REQUIRED FOR A i/I CRITICALITY AND SHOULD BE
IGNORED UNDER IOA ANALYSIS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3609
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3609
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE ASSEMBLY WEB ROLLER
L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C 3 [ 3 [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO EQUIVALENT NASA FMEA. SHOULD BE ADDED FOR COMPLETENESS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3610
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
CREW EQUIPMENT
3610
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE ASSEMBLY WEB ROLLER
L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
NO EQUIVALENT NASA FMEA. SHOULD BE ADDED FOR PURPOSES OF
COMPLETENESS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3611
NASA FMEA #: PRD-4A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
REEL
CREW EQUIPMENT
3611
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE ASSEMBLY SPRING STORAGE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
AGREE WITH NASA CRITICALITY. CHANGE IOA TO MATCH NASA.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3612
NASA FMEA #: PRD-5A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3612
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE ASSEMBLY RATCHET LATCH
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ i /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS :
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3613
NASA FMEA # : PRD-5A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3613
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE ASSEMBLY RATCHET LATCH
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ .] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3614
NASA FMEA #: PRD-SA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ASSEMBLY RELEASE
CREW EQUIPMENT
3614
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE ASSEMBLY RATCHET
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3615
NASA FMEA #: PRD-5B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ASSEMBLY RELEASE
CREW EQUIPMENT
3615
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE ASSEMBLY RATCHET
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REM_:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3616
NASA FMEA #: PRD-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONNECT PIN
CREW EQUIPMENT
3616
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE ASSEMBLY HOOK/WEB
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
RE_w_:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3700
NASA FMEA #: EVA CABLE CUTTER IA
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3700
EVA CABLE CUTTER
LEAD ANALYST: Lo GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COXPARE C I ] C ] C ] C ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] , [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3701
NASA FMEA #: EVA CABLE CUTTER IC
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3701
EVA CABLE CUTTER
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3702
NASA FMEA #: EVA CABLE CUTTER IB
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3702
EVA CABLE CUTTER
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3800
NASA FMEA #: SNATCH BLOCK 2C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3800
SNATCH BLOCK ASSEMBLY HOOK LATCH
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE IS FOR A HOOK LATCH FAILING TO OPEN (OR JAMMING
CLOSED). SINCE THE ITEM IS NOT IN USE AT THE TIME OF THE FAILURE
AND ALTERNATE MEANS OF SECURING ARE AVAILABLE, THE 3/3
CRITICALITY IS MORE REALISTIC. THEREFORE, IOA RECOMMEND CHANGING
THE CRITICALITY OF THIS ITEM TO THE NASA CRITICALITY.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3801
NASA FMEA #: SNATCH BLOCK 2F
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3801
SNATCH BLOCK ASSEMBLY HOOK SWIVEL
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[x]*
IX]
COSPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT :
CRWEQP-3802
SNATCH BLOCK 2D
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CREW EQUIPMENT
3802
SNATCH BLOCK ASSEMBLY RIGHT SPRING PLUNGER
L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NOTE: NASA FMEA WRITTEN FOR LEFT SPRING PLUNGER. LEFT AND RIGHT
PLUNGERS IDENTICAL AND CAN BE GROUPED TOGETHER.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-182
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3802A
NASA FMEA #: SNATCH BLOCK 2E
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3802
SNATCH BLOCK ASSEMBLY RIGHT SPRING PLUNGER
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] _ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NOTE: NASA FMEA ACTUALLY WRITTEN FOR LEFT SPRING PLUNGER.
AND RIGHT PLUNGERS IDENTICAL.
LEFT
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-183
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3803
NASA FMEA #: SNATCH BLOCK 2D
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3803
SNATCH BLOCKASSEMBLY LEFT SPRING PLUNGER
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] ,[ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-184
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 11/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3803A
NASA FMEA #: SNATCH BLOCK 2D
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3803
SNATCH BLOCK ASSEMBLY LEFT SPRING PLUNGER
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ 3
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / 3 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-185
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3804
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3804
SNATCH BLOCK ASSEMBLY PULL WIRE BALL END
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO EQUIVALENT NASA FMEA. A 3/3 CRITICALITY IS A NON-CRITICAL
FAILURE, BUT IT SHOULD BE ADDED TO THE NASA DATA BASE FOR
COMPLETENESS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-186
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3805
NASA FMEA #: SNATCH BLOCK 2G
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3805
SNATCH BLOCK ASSEMBLY HOOK ASSEMBLY LATCH BLOCK
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-187
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3806
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3806
SNATCH BLOCK ASSEMBLY PULLEY WHEEL
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO EQUIVALENT NASA FMEA, BUT IT SHOULD BE ADDED FOR COMPLETENESS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-188
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3807
NASA FMEA #: SNATCH BLOCK 2A
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
3807
SNATCH BLOCK ASSEMBLY HOOK
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COXPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / 3. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-189
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/21/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-4100
NASA FMEA #: 07-5-ML2-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
4100
TURNBUCKLE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
c / 1 c 1 c _ C [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-190
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/21/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-4101
NASA FMEA #: 07-5-ML2-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
4101
TURNBUCKLE
LEAD ANALYST: Lo GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
REDUNDANCY SCREENSCRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS _
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-191
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/14/88
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-4200
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
4200
LOCKER REMOVAL TOOL
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /1R ] C P ] [ P ] C P ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER DISCUSSION WITH NASA, IOA AGREES THAT THIS IS NOT A
CREDIBLE FAILURE AND SHOULD BE DELETED.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-192
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-4300
NASA FMEA #: IFM IB
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
4300
IFM BREAKOUT BOX INPUT POWER CONNECTOR
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-193
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-4301
NASA FMEA #: IFM IA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
N_ C x ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
4301
IFM BREAKOUT BOX INPUT POWER CONNECTOR
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-194
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-4302
NASA FMEA #: IFM 2D
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
4302
IFM BREAKOUT BOX AUXILIARY ON/OFF SWITCH (SWl)
LEAD ANALYST : L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-195
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-4303
NASA FMEA #: IFM 2C
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CREW EQUIPMENT
4303
I FM BREAKOUT BOX AUXILIARY ON/OFF SWITCH (SWl)
L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
]
]
]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-196
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-4304
NASA FMEA #: IFM 2A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
4304
IFM BREAKOUT BOX OUTPUT POWER CONNECTOR
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-197
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-4305
NASA FMEA #: IFM 2B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
4305
IFM BREAKOUT BOX OUTPUT POWER CONNECTOR
LEAD ANALYST: Lo GRAHAM, S° SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ .] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / .] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-198
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-4306
NASA FMEA #: IFM 3A
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
4306
IFM BREAKOUT BOX FUSE
LEAD ANALYST : L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COXPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-199
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-4306A
NASA FMEA #: IFM 4A
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
4306
IFM BREAKOUT BOX FUSE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
N_A [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] C ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-200
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-4307
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
4307
IFM BREAKOUT BOX FUSE HOLDER
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]*
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
CO,ARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO EQUIVALENT NASA FMEA BUT EFFECT IS THE SAME AS THE FUSE
FAILING OPEN OR OPENING PREMATURELY. BROKEN FUSE HOLDER IS
PROBABLY AN UNREALISTIC FAILURE SINCE FUSE CAN BE TAPED IN PLACE.
RECOMMEND DELETING THIS FMEA FROM FURTHER CONSIDERATION.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-201
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-4308
NASA FMEA #: IFM 3C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
4308
IFM BREAKOUT BOX AWG OUTPUT SELECT SWITCH (SW3)
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMA_:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-202
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
NASA DATA:
CRWEQP-4309 BASELINE [ ]
IFM 3B NEW [ X ]
COHPARE [ / ]
CREW EQUIPMENT
4309
IFM BREAKOUT BOX AWG OUTPUT SELECT SWITCH (SW3)
L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
CP]
CP]
C ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS :
[ ]-
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-203
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-4310
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
4310
IFM BREAKOUT BOX PIN CONNECTION OUTLET
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO EQUIVALENT NASA FMEA. THE IOA FAILURE IS NON-CREDIBLE AND
SHOULD BE ELIMINATED FROM FURTHER CONSIDERATION. TO HAVE THE
FAILURE OCCUR WOULD REQUIRE UNREALISTIC CHAIN OF EVENTS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-204
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-4311
NASA FMEA #: IFM 5A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
4311
IFM BREAKOUT BOX PIN/WIRE HOLDING BRACKET
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [
[ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS :
t /
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-205
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-4312
NASA FMEA #: IFM 4B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
4312
IFM BREAKOUT BOX VARIABLE VOLTAGE POWER SUPPLY
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-206
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-4313
NASA FMEA #: IFM 4B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
4313
IFM BREAKOUT BOX VARIABLE VOLTAGE POWER SUPPLY
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] -[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-207
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-4314
NASA FMEA #: IFM 4D
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
HEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
4314
IFM BREAKOUT BOX 28 V/VARIABLE SWITCH (SW2)
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-208
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
NASA DATA:
CRWEQP-4315 BASELINE [ ]
IFM 4C NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
CREW EQUIPMENT
4315
IFM BREAKOUT BOX 28 V/VARIABLE SWITCH (SW2)
L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
RE_:
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-209
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-4316
NASA FMEA #: IFM 4E
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
4316
IFM BREAKOUT BOX AWG OUTPUT SELECT SWITCH (SW4)
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-210
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-4317
NASA FMEA #: IFM 4F
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
4317
IFM BREAKOUT BOX AWG OUTPUT SELECT SWITCH (SW4)
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-211
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5101
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBS ¥STEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5101
GALLEY WATER HEATER CIRCUIT BREAKER
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] C ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] *
] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA CONSIDERED CIRCUIT BREAKERS TO BE A PART OF THE ORBITER AND
DID NOT INCLUDE THEIR FAILURE MODES IN THE ANALYSIS OF THE
GALLEY.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-212
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5102
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5102
GALLEY DC POWER BUS B SWITCH
ASSESSMENT:
S.K. SINCLAIR
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] •
] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-213
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5103
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5103
GALLEY DC POWER BUS B SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ]
IOA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / .] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-214
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5104
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5104
GALLEY DC POWER BUS B SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
coMp_ [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
C ] C ] C ] [ ] *
C ] C ] C ] [ ]
C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
C /
(If different from NASA)
] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA DOES NOT FEEL THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE FOR THIS TYPE
OF SWITCH. IOA FMEA 5104 WILL BE CANCELLED.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-215
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5105
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CREW EQUIPMENT
5105
POTABLE WATER HEATER TELEMETRY
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] •
] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT OF THE TELEMETRY WILL HAVE NO EFFECT ON THE
ACTUAL OPERATION OF THE GALLEY. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INCLUDED IN
NASA'S ANALYSIS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-216
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5106
NASA FMEA #: 1.4.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5106
RECIRCULATION PUMP
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ IN ] [ ] [ l [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-217
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5107
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5107
RECIRCULATION PUMP
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF P1 TO STOP WAS NOT CONSIDERED TO BE A SIGNIFICANT
FAILURE TO NASA AND WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THEIR ANALYSIS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-218
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5108
NASA FMEA #: 2.13.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ Z ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5108
RECIRCULATION THERMOSTAT
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
C ] [ ] C ]
C ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
[ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-219
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5109
NASA FMEA #: 2.13.2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5109
RECIRCULATION THERMOSTAT
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ _ ]
CIL
ITEM
] C ] *
] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
RE_:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-220
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT, WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
CR_QP-5110
1.3.3
CREW EQUIPMENT
5110
HOT WATER TANK
S.K. SINCLAIR
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
CP]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-221
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5111
NASA FMEA #: 2.9.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5111
WATER TANK HEATERS
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
REDUNDANCY SCREENSCRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-222
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5 i12
NASA FMEA #: 2.10.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5112
WATER TANK HEATERS
LEAD ANALYST: S°K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/nmC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ ] [ 3 [ ] [ 3
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ 3 [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE HAS THE SAME RESULTS NASA 2.10.1 - WATER HEATER
THERMOSTATS FAIL ON.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-223
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5 i13
NASA FMEA #: 2.10.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5113
WATER TANK HEATER THERMOSTAT
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] C ] C ] [.
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] _ ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMA/tKS :
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-224
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5114
NASA FMEA #: 2.10.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ _ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5114
WATER TANK HEATER THERMOSTAT
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ 1
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-225
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5115
NASA FMEA #: 1.15.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5115
HOT WATER TEMPERATURE GAUGE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COHPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-226
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5116
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CREW EQUIPMENT
5116
GALLEY OVEN CIRCUIT BREAKER
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ 3 [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA CONSIDERED CIRCUIT BREAKERS TO BE A PART OF THE ORBITER AND
DID NOT INCLUDE THEIR FAILURE MODES IN THE ANALYSIS OF THE
GALLEY.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-227
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5117
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5117
GALLEY DC POWER BUS A SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] C
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C ] C ] C
COMPARE C / ] C ] [ ] [
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS:
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-228
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5118
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5118
GALLEY DC POWER BUS A SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COXPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
]
]
]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMI_:
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-229
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5119
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5119
GALLEY DC POWER BUS A SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
] [ ] •
] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA DOES NOT CONSIDER A PARTIAL OUTPUT TO BE A CREDIBLE FAILURE
FOR THIS TYPE OF SWITCH. THIS FMEA (5119) WILL DELETED.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-230
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5120
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5120
FOOD OVEN TELEMETRY
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT OF THE TELEMETRY WAS NOT CONSIDERED BY NASA TO
BE A SIGNIFICANT FAILURE AND WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THEIR ANALYSIS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-231
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5121
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5121
GALLEY FAN CIRCUIT BREAKERS
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC • A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
] C ] *
] C ]
COMPARE C N /N ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA CONSIDERED CIRCUIT BREAKERS TO BE A PART OF THE ORBITER AND
DID NOT INCLUDE THEIR FAILURES IN THE ANALYSIS OF THE GALLEY.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-232
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5122
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5122
GALLEY OVEN FAN SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
]
]
]
B C
C ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
C ] C ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-233
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5123
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5123
GALLEY OVEN FAN SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
] C ] *
] C ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-234
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5124
NASA FMEA #: 2.8.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5124
OVEN FAN - MOTOR
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-235
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5125
NASA FMEA #: 2.8.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5125
OVEN FAN - MOTOR
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] C ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-236
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5126
NASA FMEA #: 2.8.1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5126
OVEN FAN - MOTOR
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-237
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5127
NASA FMEA #: 2.8.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5127
OVEN FAN
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ 3 C ] [ ] *
IOA C 3 /3 ] C 3 C ] C ] C ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-238
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5128
NASA FMEA #: 2.12.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5128
OVEN THERMOSTAT
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
REDUNDANCY SCREENSCRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CI_)p_T_N RATIONALE: (If
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-239
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5129
NASA FMEA #: 2.12.1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5129
OVEN THERMOSTAT
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] C
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C ] C ] [
COMPARE C / ] C ] C ] C
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS-
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-240
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5130
NASA FMEA #: 2.11.1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5130
OVEN HEATER
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BAELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-241
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5131
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5131
OVEN DOOR LAUNCH/ENTRY RESTRAINING STRAP
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] C ] [ 3 C
IOA C 3 /3 ] C ] C ] C
] [ ] .
] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA CONSIDERED THIS COMPONENT AS SECONDARY STRUCTURE AND
THEREFORE DID NOT ANALYZE IT FOR FAILURES.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-242
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5132
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5132
OVEN DOOR
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
c / i c 1 _i c [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA CONSIDERED THIS COMPONENT AS SECONDARY STRUCTURE AND
THEREFORE DID NOT ANALYZE IT FOR FAILURES.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-243
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5133
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5133
OVEN DOOR
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
] [ ] •
] [ ]
COMPARE [N /N ] C ] [ ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA CONSIDERED THIS COMPONENT AS SECONDARY STRUCTURE AND
THEREFORE DID NOT ANALYZE IT FOR FAILURES.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-244
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRWEQP-5134
CREW EQUIPMENT
5134
OVEN DOOR LATCH
B. RICHARD
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA CONSIDERED THIS COMPONENT AS SECONDARY STRUCTURE AND
THEREFORE DID NOT ANALYZE IT FOR FAILURES.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-245
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5135
NASA FMEA # :
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5135
OVEN DOOR LATCH
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If2808Happlicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA CONSIDERED THIS COMPONENT AS SECONDARY STRUCTURE AND
THEREFORE DID NOT ANALYZE IT FOR FAILURES.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-246
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5136
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5136
OVEN DOOR TRACK
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA CONSIDERED THIS COMPONENT AS SECONDARY STRUCTURE AND
THEREFORE DID NOT ANALYZE IT FOR FAILURES.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-247
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5137
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5137
OVEN DooR TRACK
LEAD ANALYST : B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
[ ]
COMPARE C N /N ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA CONSIDERED THIS COMPONENT AS SECONDARY STRUCTURE AND
THEREFORE DID NOT ANALYZE IT FOR FAILURES.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-248
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5138
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5138
OVEN GASKET
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA DID NOT CONSIDER THIS TO BE A SIGNIFICANT FAILURE AND
THEREFORE DID NOT INCLUDE IT IN THEIR ANALYSIS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-249
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5139
NASA FMEA # :
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5139
OVEN SHELF ASSEMBLY - UPPER RACK
LEAD ANALYST : B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
NASA C / ] C ] C ] [
IOA C 3 /3 ] C ] C 3 [
ITEM
] [ ] •
] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA CONSIDERED THIS COMPONENT AS SECONDARY STRUCTURE AND
THEREFORE DID NOT ANALYZE IT FOR FAILURES.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-250
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5140
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
•MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5140
LOWER SHELF ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA CONSIDERED THIS COMPONENT AS SECONDARY STRUCTURE AND
THEREFORE DID NOT ANALYZE IT FOR FAILURES.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-251
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5141
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5141
LOWER TRACKS
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA CONSIDERED THIS COMPONENT AS SECONDARY STRUCTURE AND
THEREFORE DID NOT ANALYZE IT FOR FAILURES.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-252
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5142
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5142
OVEN SCREEN
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SINCE THE SCREEN CAN BE CLEANED, THIS IS NOT CONSIDERED A
CREDIBLE FAILURE BY NASA. THIS FMEA (5142) WILL BE DELETED.
_ REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-253
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5143
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5143
OVEN SCREEN
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA CONSIDERED THIS COMPONENT AS SECONDARY STRUCTURE AND
THEREFORE DID NOT ANALYZE IT FOR FAILURES.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-254
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5144
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5144
SPRING LOADED PLATE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
LEAD ANALYST:
4
ASSESSMENT:
B. RICHARD
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
C ] C ] C ] C ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA CONSIDERED THIS COMPONENT AS SECONDARY STRUCTURE AND
THEREFORE DID NOT ANALYZE IT FOR FAILURES.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-255
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5145
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW[
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5145
OVEN SPRING CLIP
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[
[
[
CIL
ITEM
B C
] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA CONSIDERED THIS COMPONENT AS SECONDARY STRUCTURE AND
THEREFORE DID NOT ANALYZE IT FOR FAILURES.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-256
t
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRWEQP-5146
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CREW EQUIPMENT
5146
OVEN FINNED PLATE HEAT SINK
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
B. RICHARD
A B C
C ] [ ] C ] C ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] C ] C ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA CONSIDERED THIS COMPONENT AS SECONDARY STRUCTURE AND
THEREFORE DID NOT ANALYZE IT FOR FAILURES.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-257
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5147
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5147
GALLEY CONTROL ELECTRONICS
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
ClL
ITEM
] [ ] •
] [ ]
COMPARE [ N IN ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS WAS NOT CONSIDERED TO BE A CREDIBLE FAILURE BY NASA; ALSO
ASSOCIATED FAILURES ARE COVERED BY OTHER FMEAs ON INDIVIDUAL
SWITCHES. THIS FMEA (5147) WILL BE DELETED.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-258
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5148
NASA FMEA #: 2.7.1, 2.7.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5148
WATER QUANTITY SELECTOR SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM.
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE IS COVERED BY NASA FMEAs 2.7.1 AND 2.7.2.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-259
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5149
NASA FMEA #: 2.7.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5149
WATER QUANTITY SELECTOR SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] C 3
IOA C 3 /3 ] C ] C ] [ 3
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-260
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5150
NASA FMEA #: 2.7.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5150
WATER QUANTITY SELECTOR SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
REDUNDANCY SCREENSCRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-261
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRWEQP-5151
CREW EQUIPMENT
5151
REHYDRATION PUMP
B. RICHARD
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
A B C
[ ] C ] C ] C ] *
[ ] C ] C ] C ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF P2 TO STOP WAS NOT CONSIDERED TO BE A SIGNIFICANT
FAILURE TO NASA AND WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THEIR ANALYSIS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-262
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5152
NASA FMEA #: 1.5.1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5152
REHYDRATION PUMP
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
] C ] *
] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ 3 [ 3 [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-263
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5153
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5153
RHS LEVER ARM CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST : B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] f ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF THIS SWITCH OPEN COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF THE GALLEY.
A DIFFERENCE IN GROUNDRULES ACCOUNTS FOR THE DIFFERENCE IN
CRITICALITY RATINGS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-264
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5154
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5154
RHS LEVER ARM CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A DIFFERENCE IN GROUNDRULES ACCOUNTS FOR THE SLIGHT DIFFERENCE IN
CRITICALITY RATINGS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-265
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENTID: CRWEQP-5155
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREWEQUIPMENT
5155
REHYDRATION STATION SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A DIFFERENCE IN GROUNDRULES ACCOUNTS FOR THE SLIGHT DIFFERENCE IN
THE CRITICALITY RATINGS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-266
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5156
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5156
REHYDRATION STATION SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A DIFFERENCE IN GROUNDRULES ACCOUNTS FOR THE SLIGHT DIFFERENCE IN
THE CRITICALITY RATINGS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-267
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5157
NASA FMEA #: 2.6.1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CREW EQUIPMENT
5157
COLD WATER FILL PUSH BUTTON SWITCH
B. RICHARD
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
]
]
]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-268
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5158
NASA FMEA #: 2.6.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5158
COLD WATER FILL PUSH BUTTON SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/.88 C-269
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5159
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5159
COLD WATER FILL SWITCH - LIGHT
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA DID NOT CONSIDER THIS FAILURE SIGNIFICANT AND DID NOT
INCLUDE IT IN THEIR ANALYSIS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-270
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5160
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5160
COLD WATER FILL SWITCH - LIGHT
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA DID NOT CONSIDER THIS FAILURE SIGNIFICANT AND DID NOT
INCLUDE IT IN THEIR ANALYSIS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-271
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5161
NASA FMEA #: 1.9.2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST :
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CREW EQUIPMENT
5161
RHS CHILLED WATER FEED SOLENOID/VALVE
B. RICHARD
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / 3 [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
]
]
]
B C
[ ] C ]
C ] C ]
[ ] C ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-272
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA DATA:
CRWEQP-5162 BASELINE [ ]
1.9.1 NEW [ X ]
CREW EQUIPMENT
5162
RHS CHILLED WATER FEED SOLENOID/VALVE
B. RICHARD
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
]
]
]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-273
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5163
NASA FMEA #: 1.8.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5163
RHS OUTLET SOLENOID VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C ] C ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C 3
C 3
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-274
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5164
NASA FMEA #: 1.8.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5164
RHS OUTLET SOLENOID VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] C ]
COMPARE C /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A DIFFERENCE IN GROUNDRULES ACCOUNTS FOR THE SLIGHT DIFFERENCE IN
CRITICALITY RATINGS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-275
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5165
NASA FMEA #: 1.7.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
_zw [ x ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5165
RHS BYPASS SOLENOID VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ 3
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / 3 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-276
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5166
NASA FMEA #: 1.7.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5166
RHS BYPASS SOLENOID VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A DIFFERENCE IN GROUNDRULES ACCOUNTS FOR THE SLIGHT DIFFERENCE IN
THE CRITICALITY RATINGS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-277
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
CR_QP-5167
2.5.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CREW EQUIPMENT
5167
HOT WATER FILL PUSH BUTTON SWITCH
B. RICHARD
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
3
]
3
B C
C ] C ]
C ] C ]
C ] C ]
CIL
ITEM
C 3 *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-278
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5168
NASA FMEA #: 2.5.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5168
HOT WATER FILL PUSH BUTTON SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA _ [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
] C ] C ]
] C ] [ ]
] [ ] C ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-279
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRWEQP-5169
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CREW EQUIPMENT
5169
HOT WATER FILL SWITCH - LIGHT
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
B. RICHARD
A B C
C ] C ] C ] C ] *
C ] C ] C ] C ]
C ] C ] C ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA DID NOT CONSIDER THIS FAILURE SIGNIFICANT AND DID NOT
INCLUDE IT IN THEIR ANALYSIS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-280
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5170
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
LEAD ANALYST:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5170
HOT WATER FILL SWITCH - LIGHT
ASSESSMENT:
B. RICHARD
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA DID NOT CONSIDER THIS FAILURE SIGNIFICANT AND DID NOT
INCLUDE IT IN THEIR ANALYSIS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-281
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5171
NASA FMEA #: 1.6.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5171
COLD WATER RECIRCULATION SOLENOID/VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] C ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REM_:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-282
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5172
NASA FMEA #: 1.6.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW C x ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5172
COLD WATER RECIRCULATION SOLENOID/VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-283
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA # :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST :
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRWEQP-5173
1.14.1
CREW EQUIPMENT
5173
RHS NEEDLE
B. RICHARD
A
[
[
[
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
B C
] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A DIFFERENCE IN GROUNDRULES ACCOUNTS FOR THE SLIGHT DIFFERENCE IN
THE CRITICALITY RATINGS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-284
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5174
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5174
RHS CUP RETAINER
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA CONSIDERED THIS COMPONENT AS SECONDARY STRUCTURE AND
THEREFORE DID NOT ANALYZE IT FOR FAILURES.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-285
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5175
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
LEAD ANALYST:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5175
RHS CUP RETAINER PARALLEL RODS
ASSESSMENT:
B. RICHARD
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N IN ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA CONSIDERED THIS COMPONENT AS SECONDARY STRUCTURE AND
THEREFORE DID NOT ANALYZE IT FOR FAILURE.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-286
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5176
NASA FMEA # :
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5176
RHS CUP RETAINER PARALLEL RODS
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
COMPARE C N /N ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
NASA CONSIDERED THIS COMPONENT AS SECONDARY STRUCTURE AND
THEREFORE DID NOT ANALYZE IT FOR FAILURES.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-287
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5177
NASA FMEA # :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5177
RHS "TRANSPARENT CHAMBER"
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA CONSIDERED THIS COMPONENT AS SECONDARY STRUCTURE AND
THEREFORE DID NOT ANALYZE IT FOR FAILURES.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-288
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5178
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5178
INLET wATER CONNECTIONS
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A DIFFERENCE IN GROUNDRULES ACCOUNTS FOR THE SLIGHT DIFFERENCE IN
THE CRITICALITY RATINGS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-289
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5179
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.1, 1.2.3
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5179
INLET WATER CONNECTIONS
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
NASA
IOA
[ S/2R] [ ]
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ]
C ] C ]
CP] CP]
COMPARE C / ] [ N ] C N ] C N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEw C x ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-290
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5180
NASA FMEA #: I.i.I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5180
MANUAL SHUT OFF VALVE
LEAD ANALYST : B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
CP] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
C ] *
C ]
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A DIFFERENCE IN GROUNDRULES ACCOUNTS FOR THE SLIGHT DIFFERENCE IN
CRITICALITY RATINGS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-291
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5181
NASA FMEA #:
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CREW EQUIPMENT
5181
AUXILIARY PORT - POTABLE WATER
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RESTRICTED FLOW OF THE AUXILIARY PORT WAS NOT CONSIDERED BY NASA
IN THEIR ANALYSIS OF THE GALLEY.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-292
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/02/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5300
NASA FMEA #: OWDA-10A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5300
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER QUICK DISCONNECTS
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[P] [P] [P] [
[P] [P] [P] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE QUICK DISCONNECTS ARE A SUB-PART OF THE HOSE ASSEMBLY
REFERENCED IN THE NASA FMEA.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-293
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/02/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5301
NASA FMEA #: OWDA-10A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5301
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER QUICK DISCONNECTS
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[P] [P] [P] [ ]*
[P] [P] [P] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS :
[ / ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
(If different from NASA)
[ ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
THE QUICK DISCONNECTS ARE A SUB-PART OF THE HOSE ASSEMBLY
REFERENCED IN THE NASA FMEA.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-294
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/02/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5302
NASA FMEA #: OWDA-6A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
WATER VALVE
CREW EQUIPMENT
5302
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER AMBIENT/CHILLED/OFF
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-295
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/02/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5303
NASA FMEA #: OWDA-6D
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
WATER VALVE
CREW EQUIPMENT
5303
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER AMBIENT/CHILLED/OFF
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA FMEA CARRIES THE OVERALL FAILURE MODE OF EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE, BUT DESCRIBES THE EFFECTS OF NASA FMEA OWDA-6D - FAILS
OPEN/INTERNAL LEAKAGE.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-296
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/02/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5304
NASA FMEA #: OWDA-6B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
WATER VALVE
CREW EQUIPMENT
5304
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER AMBIENT/CHILLED/OFF
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AGREE WITH NASA CRITICALITY. HAVING WATER AVAILABLE AT ONLY ONE
TEMPERATURE SHOULD NOT CAUSE A MISSION ABORT.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-297
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/02/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5305
NASA FMEA #: OWDA-4B
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CREW EQUIPMENT
5305
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER PRESSURE REGULATOR
L. GRAHAM t S. SINCLAIR
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[' / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-298
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/02/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5306
NASA FMEA #: OWDA-4C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5306
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER PRESSURE REGULATOR
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
NASA
IOA
C3/3 3 C ]
C312R] CP]
C ] [ ] [
CP] [P] [
] *
]
COMPARE C /N ] C N ] C N ] C N ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA DOES NOT CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE LEAKAGE WILL
RENDER THE PRESSURE REGULATOR AND THUS THE OWDA INOPERABLE. IF
THE LEAK IS SMALL, THE OWDA IS USABLE. HOWEVER, A LARGE LEAK
WILL DECREASE THE PRESSURE AND PREVENT WATER FROM REACHING
THE CREW. THE ISSUE WILL BE DISCUSSED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-299
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/02/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5307
NASA FMEA #: OWDA-SA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5307
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER BYPASS VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-300
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/02/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5308
NASA FMEA #: OWDA-5B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5308
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER BYPASS VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
NASA
IOA
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FMEA 5308 LISTS AN OVERALL FAILURE MODE OF EXTERNAL LEAKAGE,
BUT DESCRIBES THE EFFECTS TO MATCH NASA FMEA OWDA-5B - FAILS
OPEN/INTERNAL LEAKAGE.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-301
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/02/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANAL¥ST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
CRWEQP-5309
OWDA-3B
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CREW EQUIPMENT
5309
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER SOLENOID VALVE
L. GRAHAM, S° SINCLAIR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-302
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/02/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5310
NASA FMEA #: OWDA-3A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5310
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER SOLENOID VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 12R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FMEA IS TITLED WITH A FAILURE MODE OF EXTERNAL LEAKAGE.
HOWEVER, THE EFFECTS DESCRIBE THE CASE OF FAILING OPEN/LEAKS
INTERNALLY AS WRITTEN IN THE NASA FMEA.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-303
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/02/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5311
NASA FMEA #: OWDA-IIA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
SWITCH
CREW EQUIPMENT
5311
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER ROTARY SELECTION
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] C ] C ] C
] *
]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-304
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/02/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5312
NASA FMEA #: OWDA-2C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5312
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER REHYDRATION NEEDLE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/nmC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-305
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5313
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
VALVE
CREW EQUIPMENT
5313
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER MICROBIAL CHECK
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO EQUIVALENT NASA FMEA. SHOULD BE ADDED TO NASA DATA BASE FOR
COMPLETENESS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-306
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/02/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5314
NASA FMEA #: OWDA-7A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
VALVE
CREW EQUIPMENT
5314
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER MICROBIAL CHECK
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-307
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/03/87
ASSESSMENTID: CRWEQP-5315
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[ ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
VALVE
CREW EQUIPMENT
5315
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER MICROBIAL CHECK
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
NASA
IOA
C / ] [ ]
C 3 /2R ] [ p ]
C ] C ] C
CP] CP] C
] *
]
COMPARE C N /N ] C N ] [ N ] C N ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COMPARABLE NASA FMEA. UPON CLOSER EXAMINATION IOA FEELS THAT
THIS FAILURE IS UNREALISTIC AND SHOULD BE DELETED FROM THE IOA
DATA BASE.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-308
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/02/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5316
NASA FMEA #: OWDA-8A
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
VALVE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CREW EQUIPMENT
5316
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER PERSONAL HYGIENE
L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] C ]. C ] ,C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
RE_:
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-309
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/02/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5317
NASA FMEA # : OWDA-8B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
VALVE
CREW EQUIPMENT
5317
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER PERSONAL HYGIENE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] [ ] C
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-310
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/02/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5318
NASA FMEA #: OWDA-8A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
VALVE
CREW EQUIPMENT
5318
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER PERSONAL HYGIENE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
C-311REPORT DATE 02/12/88
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/02/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5319
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5319
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER HOLDING CLIPS
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO EQUIVALENT NASA FMEA BUT IT SHOULD BE ADDED FOR COMPLETENESS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-312
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/02/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5320
NASA FMEA #: OWDA-14A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONNECTOR
CREW EQUIPMENT
5320
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER INPUT POWER
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
NASA
IOA
[3/2R] [P]
[3/3 ] [ ]
[P] [P] [
[ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE INPUT POWER CONNECTOR IS A SUB-PART OF THE OVERALL OWDA
CONTROLLER. CRITICALITY SHOULD BE CHANGED TO MATCH NASAs SINCE
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT METHODS TO PROVIDE WATER TO THE CREW WILL
RESULT IN A LOSS OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-313
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/02/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5321
NASA FMEA # : OWDA-9A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5321
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER FLEX LINE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
RE__
THE NASA FMEA IS ACTUALLY WRITTEN FOR A LEAKAGE IN THE LINE.
LEAK, IF TAKEN TOWORST CASE, CAN BE CONSIDERED A STRUCTURAL
FAILURE.
A
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-314
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/02/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5322
NASA FMEA #: OWDA-9B
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CREW EQUIPMENT
5322
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER FLEX LINES
L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
CP] CP]
C ] [ ]
c
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-315
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5400
NASA FMEA #: CWDA-15A
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5400
CONTINGENCY WATER DISPENSER
ASSESSMENT:
L° GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA DOES NOT CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE LEAK CAN BE
SEVERE ENOUGH TO PREVENT THE USE OF THE CWDA. SINCE WORST CASE
ANALYSIS REQUIRES THAT THIS BE DONE, IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE
CRITICALITY BE CHANGED TO A 3/2R.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-316
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/04/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRWEQP-5400A
CWDA-17B
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CREW EQUIPMENT
5400
CONTINGENCY WATER DISPENSER
L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [p]
[N] [N] [N]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA DOES NOT CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE LEAK CAN BE
SEVERE ENOUGH TO PREVENT THE USE OF THE CWDA. A WORST CASE LEAK
WOULD DO THIS. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT ASSIGNING THE 3/2R
CRITICALITY TO THE CWDA CONNECTION.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-317
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-5401
NASA FMEA #: CWDA-15B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ x ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
5401
CONTINGENCY WATER DISPENSER
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
COMPARE C / ] C ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-318
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRWEQP-5402
CWDA-16A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CREW EQUIPMENT
5402
CONTINGENCY WATER DISPENSER
L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
C
[P]
C ]
[ N ]
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
IN] IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
AGREE WITH NASA CRITICALITIES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-319
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/14/88
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-6100
NASA FMEA # :
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
6100
SLEEPING BAG - ADJUSTABLE STRAPS
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C / ] [ ] C ] [
IOA C 3 /3 ] [ 3 C ] C
] C ] *
] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA DID NOT CONSIDER THIS FAILURE SIGNIFICANT AND DID NOT
INCLUDE IT IN THEIR ANALYSIS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-320
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/14/88
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-6101
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
6101
SLEEPING BAG - HELICAL SPRING
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
DATA WAS NOT AVAILABLE FROM NASA FOR THIS ASSESSMENT.
C ]
C ]
C-321REPORT DATE 02/12/88
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/14/88
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-6102
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CREW EQUIPMENT
6102
SLEEPING BAG - CLOTH TUNNEL
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ 3 [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
DATA WAS NOT AVAILABLE FROM NASA FOR THIS ASSESSMENT.
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-322
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/14/88
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-6103
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
6103
SLEEPING BAG -SPRING CLIP
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
DATA WAS NOT AVAILABLE FROM NASA FOR THIS ASSESSMENT.
C ]
C ]
C-323REPORT DATE 02/12/88
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/14/88
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-6104
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
6104
SLEEPING BAG - SPRING CLIP
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
_[
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
DATA WAS NOT AVAILABLE FROM NASA FOR THIS ASSESSMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-324
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/14/88
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-6105
NASA FMEA # :
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
6105
SLEEPING BAG - PIP PIN
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] C ]
C ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
DATA WAS NOT AVAILABLE FROM NASA FOR THIS ASSESSMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-325
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/14/88
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-6106
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
6106
SLEEPING BAG - MOUNTING LOCATION
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
NASA [ / ] [ 3 [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
DATA WAS NOT AVAILABLE FROM NASA FOR THIS ASSESSMENT.
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-326
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/14/88
ASSESSMENTID: CRWEQP-6107
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
6107
SLEEPING BAG RESTRAINTS - BUCKLE FLAP
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
(If different from NASA)
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
DATA WAS NOT AVAILABLE FROM NASA FOR THIS ASSESSMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-327
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/14/88
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-6108
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
6108
ATTACHMENT ZIPPER(S)
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
cosp_ [ N /N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
C ] C ] C ]
C ] C ] C ]
C ] C ] C ]
(If different from NASA)
C ] *
C ]
C ]
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
DATA WAS NOT AVAILABLE FROM NASA FOR THIS ASSESSMENT.
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-328
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/14/88
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-6109
NASA FMEA # :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
6109
CLOSURE ZIPPER
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
DATA WAS NOT AVAILABLE FROM NASA FOR THIS ASSESSMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-329
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/14/88
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-6110
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
6110
BODY RESTRAINTS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ 3 [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ N /S ] [ 3 [ ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
DATA WAS NOT AVAILABLE FROM NASA FOR THIS ASSESSMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-330
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/14/88
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-6111
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
6111
FOUR-TIER SLEEP STATION SLIDING DOOR
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ] [
[ ] [ ] [
[ ] [ ] [
C
(If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
DATA WAS NOT AVAILABLE FROM NASA FOR THIS ASSESSMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-331
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/14/88
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-6112
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FASTENER
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CREW EQUIPMENT
6112
FOUR-TIER SLEEP STATION CAPTIVE WING NUT
H. SAXON
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ] [
[ ] [ ] [ ] [
[ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
DATA WAS NOT AVAILABLE FROM NASA FOR THIS ASSESSMENT.
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-332
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/14/88
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-6113
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CREW EQUIPMENT
6113
FOUR-TIER SLEEP STATION AIR DIFFUSER
H. SAXON
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ], [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
DATA WAS NOT AVAILABLE FROM NASA FOR THIS ASSESSMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-333
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE : 1/14/88
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-6114
NASA FMEA # :
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
6114
FOUR-TIER SLEEP STATION LIGHT
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
DATA WAS NOT AVAILABLE FROM NASA FOR THIS ASSESSMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-334
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/09/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-6200
NASA FMEA #: PIP PIN (i) A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
6200
ORBITER SIDE HATCH SAFETY LOCK PIP PIN
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
CP]
CP]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-335
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/09/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-6201
NASA FMEA #: PIP PIN (i) B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
6201
ORBITER SIDE HATCH SAFETY LOCK PIP PIN
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
RE_:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-336
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-6300
NASA FMEA #: REF #1, 2, 3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
6300
MIDDECK STOWAGE LOCKER DOOR
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA GROUND RULE STATES THAT LOCKER TOOLS AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES
ARE ALWAYS STORED IN SEPARATE LOCKERS. THIS WOULD VIRTUALLY
ELIMINATE THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE CREW COULD NOT ACCESS MEDICAL
SUPPLIES. SUGGEST THAT IOA CRITICALITY BE CHANGED TO 3/3
TO MATCH NASA'S.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-337
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-6301
NASA FMEA #: REF #4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
6301
MIDDECK STOWAGE LOCKER DOOR
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 3 C ] C ] C ]
IOA C 3 /3 ] C ] C ] C ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-338
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-6302
NASA FMEA #: REF #6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
6302
MIDDECK STOWAGE LOCKER DOOR HINGE PIN
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REI_:
C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-339
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-6303
NASA FMEA #: REF #5, 7, 8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
6303
MIDDECK STOWAGE LOCKER DOOR
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA DOES NOT FEEL THAT THIS FAILURE COULD ACTUALLY RESULT IN
SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE TO THE VEHICLE OR SIGNIFICANT INJURY TO THE
CREW. RECOMMEND THAT THE IOA CRITICALITY BE CHANGED TO 3/3 TO
MATCH NASA'S.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-340
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-6400
NASA FMEA #: TREADMILL 9A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
6400
TREADMILL EXERCISER ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: Lo GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
]
]
]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-341
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-6401
NASA FMEA #: TREADMILL 2A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
6401
TREADMILL EXERCISER ASSEMBLY BUNGEE FORCE CORD
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-342
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-6402
NASA FMEA #: TREADMILL 4A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
6402
TREADMILL EXERCISER ASSEMBLY SHOULDER STRAP
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C 3
C 3
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-343
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-6403
NASA FMEA #: TREADMILL 3A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
6403
TREADMILL EXERCISERASSEMBLY WAIST BELT
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] C ] C ] C ] [
] *
]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
RE_:
C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-344
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-6404
NASA FMEA #: TREADMILL 5A
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MONITOR
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/nmC
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CREW EQUIPMENT
6404
TREADMILL EXERCISER ASSEMBLY PHYSIOLOGICAL
L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
]
]
]
B C
C ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
C ] C ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-345
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-6405
NASA FMEA #: TREADMILL 6A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
6405
TREADMILL EXERCISER ASSEMBLY HANDLE ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, So SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [
[ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
3
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] C ] C ] C 3
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C I 3 C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-346
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/nmC
CRWEQP-6406
TREADMILL 5A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CREW EQUIPMENT
6406
TREADMILL EXERCISE ASSEMBLY INFRARED SENSOR
L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
]
]
]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-347
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
CRWEQP-6407 '
TREADMILL7A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CREW EQUIPMENT
6407
TREADMILL EXERCISERASSEMBLY SPEED CONTROL KNOB
L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
]
]
]
B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-348
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-6408
NASA FMEA #: TREADMILL 1A
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
CREW EQUIPMENT
6408
TREADMILL EXERCISER ASSEMBLY ATTACHMENT FITTINGS
L. GRAHAM, S° SINCLAIR
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
BELIEVE LATER REVISION OF THIS FMEA WILL LOWER THE CRITICALITY OF
THE TREADMILL ATTACH POINTS TO A NON-CIL LEVEL TO COMPLY WITH CCB
DIRECTIVES.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-349
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-6500
NASA FMEA #: 07-1-725101-4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTROL/POWER SWITCH
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CREW EQUIPMENT
6500
CREWMAN OPTICAL ALIGNMENT SIGHT (COAS)
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
INTENSITY
C
[P]
[ ]
EN ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-350
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-6501
NASA FMEA #: 07-1-725101-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTROL
CREW EQUIPMENT
6501
CREWMAN OPTICAL ALIGNMENT SIGHT (COAS) INTENSITY
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[p] [P] [P] [
[ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-351
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-6502
NASA FMEA #: 07-1-725101-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BULB
CREW EQUIPMENT
6502
CREWMAN OPTICAL ALIGNMENT SIGHT (COAS) LIGHT
LEAD ANALYST: L° GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
NASA
IOA
COMPARE
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
C 3/3 ] C ] [ 3 C ]
[ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
RE_-
C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-352
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-6503
NASA FMEA #: 07-1-725101-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BASE
CREW EQUIPMENT
6503
CREWMAN OPTICAL ALIGNMENT SIGHT (COAS) MOUNTING
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
NASA
IOA
[3/IR] [P]
[3/3 ] [ ]
CP] CP] C
[ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REM_:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-353
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-6504
NASA FMEA #: 07-1-725102-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ADAPTER BRACKET
CREW EQUIPMENT
6504
CREWMAN OPTICAL ALIGNMENT SIGHT (COAS) FORWARD
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [p] [p] [
[ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE _ [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-354
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-6505
NASA FMEA #: 07-1-725102-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ADAPTER BRACKET
CREW EQUIPMENT
6505
CREWMAN OPTICAL ALIGNMENT SIGHT (COAS) FORWARD
LEAD ANALYST : L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
NASA
IOA
[3/IR] [P]
[3/3 ] [ 3
[P] [P] [
[ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
RE_:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-355
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/11/88
ASSESSMENTID: CRWEQP-6506
NASA FMEA #: 07-1-725103-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MOUNTING BRACKET
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST :
CREW EQUIPMENT
6506
CREWMAN OPTICAL ALIGNMENT SIGHT (COAS) AFT
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
NASA
IOA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
[P] CP] [
C ] [ ] [
] *
]
[ 3/IR] [ P ]
C3/3 ] [ ]
C ]COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA9
C / ] C ] C 3 C 3 C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
RE_:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-356
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-6507
NASA FMEA #: 07-1-725102-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MOUNTING BRACKET
CREW EQUIPMENT
6507
CREWMAN OPTICAL ALIGNMENT SIGHT (COAS) FORWARD
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [P] [
[ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-357
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-6508
NASA FMEA #: 07-1-725101-7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
STOP
CREW EQUIPMENT
6508
CREWMAN OPTICAL ALIGNMENT SIGHT (COAS) APERTURE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [P] [
[ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [
] *
]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-358
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-6509
NASA FMEA # : 07-1-725101-6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
STOP
CREW EQUIPMENT
6509
CREWMAN OPTICAL ALIGNMENT SIGHT (COAS) APERTURE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
NASA
IOA
[3/IR] [P]
[3/3 ] [ ]
CP] CP3 [
C ] C ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ IN "] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:- (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ 3 [ 3 [ ] [ 3
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMA_ :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-359
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-65 I0
NASA FMEA #: 07-1-725101-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LENS ASSEMBLY
CREW EQUIPMENT
6510
CREWMAN OPTICAL ALIGNMENT SIGHT (COAS) COMBINER
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [P] [
[ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE" [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-360
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-6511
NASA FMEA #: 07-1-725101-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ x ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LOCK
CREW EQUIPMENT
6511
CREWMAN OPTICAL ALIGNMENT SIGHT (COAS) BARREL
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/nmC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
NASA
IOA
[3/IR] [P]
[3/3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /_ 3 [ N ]
[P] [P3 [
[ ] [ 3 [
[N] IN]. [
] *
]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ 3
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REM_:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-361
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/14/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-II215X
NASA FMEA #: JSC22453-1A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW C x ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
11215
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY - BATTERY CELL
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE C / ] C ] C ] [
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMAR_:
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-362
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/14/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-I1216X
NASA FMEA #: JSC22453-2A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
11216
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY - BATTERY CELL
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
ClL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
RE_:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-363
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/14/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-II217X
NASA FMEA #: JSC22453-4A
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CREW EQUIPMENT
11217
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY - THERMOSTAT
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIOMS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-364
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/14/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-II218X
NASA FMEA #: JSC22453-5A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
11218
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY - THERMOSTAT
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[P] [P] [P]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
(If different from NASA)
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-365
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/14/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-11219X
NASA FMEA #: JSC22453-6A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
11219
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY - LIGHT SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
CO,mARE [ / ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P] [P]
C ] C ] C ]
(If different from NASA)
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-366
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/14/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-II220X
NASA FMEA #: JSC22453-6B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
11220
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY - LIGHT SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
CP]
CP]
C ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-367
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/14/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-II221X
NASA FMEA #: JSC22453-11A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
11221
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY - FINGER CONTACT ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-368
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/14/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-II222X
NASA FMEA #: JSC22453-12A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
11222
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY - ELECTRICAL CONNECTOR
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS _
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-369
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/14/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-II325X
NASA FMEA #: OBS 2B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ASSEMBLY
CREW EQUIPMENT
11325
OBS - SIGNAL CONDITIONER - BATTERY CONTACT
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS IS A NEW ITEM ADDED TO THE IOA DATA BASE DURING THE
ASSESSMENT PROCESS. IOA CRITICALITY IS MATCHED TO THE NASA IVA
CRITICALITY UNDER WORST CASE ANALYSIS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-370
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/14/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-II326X
NASA FMEA #: OBS 2D
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
11326
OBS - SIGNAL CONDITIONER
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] [P] [P]
[P] [P] [P]
C ] C ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NEW ITEM ADDED TO THE IOA DATA BASE DURING THE ASSESSMENT
PROCESS. IOA CRITICALITY IS MATCHED TO THE NASA IVA CRITICALITY
UNDER WORST CASE ANALYSIS PROCESS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-371
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/14/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-II327X
NASA FMEA #: OBS 3B
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
11327
OBS - IVA CABLE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [p]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] C ] C ]
[ ] *
C ]
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-372
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-II433X
NASA FMEA #: JSC22480-17B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT
MDAC ID: 11433
ITEM: PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT ARTICULATING SOCKET
ASSEMBLY QUICK RELEASE PIN
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-373
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-12110X
NASA FMEA #: 07-1B-SW7-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
12110
EVA SLIDEWIRE CUSHION
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
N_[X]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-374
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/18/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-12214X
NASA FMEA # : JSCI7067B-IC
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW C x ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
12214
ERCM SAFETY TETHER - CABLE THIMBLE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-375
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/02/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA # :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST :
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
CRWEQP-13113X
TUBE CUTTER 6H
CREW EQUIPMENT
13113
TUBE CUTTER PAWL
S.K. SINCLAIR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
C P ] C P ]
CP] [P]
C ] C ]
c
[P]
[P]
[ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-376
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/02/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-13309X
NASA FMEA #: 3-POINT LATCH 5G
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
13309
SAFETY RELEASE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-377
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/02/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-13310X
NASA FMEA #: 3-POINT LATCH TOOL
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
13310
RELEASE SPRING
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
COMPARE C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-378
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-13418X
NASA FMEA #: EVA WINCH 3N
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
13418
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY PIP PIN
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-379
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST :
ASSESSMENT :
CRWEQP-13419X
EVA WINCH 3M
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CREW EQUIPMENT
13419
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY PIP PIN
S.K. SINCLAIR
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-380
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-13420X
NASA FMEA #: EVA WINCH 3K
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
N_ [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
13420
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY HOOK
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] C 3 [ ] C ] C
IOA C 3 /3 ] C 3 [ ] C ] [
] *
]
COMPARE C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-381
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 11/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRWEQP-13421X
EVA WINCH 3L
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CREW EQUIPMENT
13421
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY HOOK
S.K. SINCLAIR
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY sCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-382
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-13422X
NASA FMEA #: EVA WINCH 3J
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
SPRING
CREW EQUIPMENT
13422
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY INTERIOR COIL
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-383
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-13620X
NASA FMEA #: PRD-6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
13620
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE HOUSING ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-384
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-13621X
NASA FMEA #: PRD-3B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
13621
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE HOOK LATCH
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-385
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-13808X
NASA FMEA #: SNATCH BLOCK - 2B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
13808
SNATCH BLOCK ASSEMBLY HOOK LATCH
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-386
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 11/19/87
ASSESSMENTID: CRWEQP-13809X
NASA FMEA #: SNATCHBLOCK 2B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
13809
SNATCH BLOCK ASSEMBLY HOOK LATCH
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
CP] CP] CP]
C ] C ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS. 3/3
CRITICALITY IS MORE REALISTIC AND ISSUE WILL BE DISCUSSED WITH
NASA SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-387
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-15182X
NASA FMEA #: 1.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
15182
MANUAL SHUT OFF VALVE (MV3)
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS:
C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-388
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-15183X
NASA FMEA #: 1.1.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
15183
MANUAL SHUT OFF VALVE (MV3)
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/nmC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
[3/2R] [ ]
[3/2R] [P]
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
] *
]
CO.ARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] E i
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-389
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-15184X
NASA FMEA #: 1.3.1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
15184
HOT WATER TANK O-RING
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-390
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-15185X
NASA FMEA #: 1.4.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
15185
RECIRCULATION PUMP (PI) SEAL
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
_DW/_mC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
[3/2R] [ ]
[3/2R] [P]
[ ] [ ]
[p] [P]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: _If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-391
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-15186X
NASA FMEA #: 1.5.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
15186
REHYDRATION PUMP (P2)
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
C ] C ] [ ]
CP] CP] [P]
COMPARE [ /
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS-
[ ]
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-392
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-15187X
NASA FMEA #: 1.6.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
15187
COLD WATER RECIRCULATION VALVE (SV1)
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-393
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-15188X
NASA FMEA #: 1.7.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
15188
RHS COLD WATER RECIRCULATION VALVE (SV2)
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
[3/2R] [ ]
[3/2R] [P]
[ ] C ]
CP] [P]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE : (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-394
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-15189X
NASA FMEA #: 1.8.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
15189
RHS OUTLET SOLENOID VALVE (SV3)
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [p] [P]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] C ]
REcoMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-395
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-15190X
NASA FMEA #: 1.9.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
15190
RHS CHILLED WATER FEED SOLENOID VALVE (SV4)
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [p]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
C ]
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-396
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-15191X
NASA FMEA #: i.i0.I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
_r_w [ x ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
15191
CHECK VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-397
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-15192X
NASA FMEA #: 1.10.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
15192
CHECK VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-398
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
CRWEQP-15193X
1.10.3
CREW EQUIPMENT
15193
CHECK VALVE SEAL
B. RICHARD
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N] [N]
C
C ]
CP]
[N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-399
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-15194X
NASA FMEA #: i.ii.I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
15194
MIXING VALVE (MV2)
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-400
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-15195X
NASA FMEA #: 1.12.1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
15195
MICROBIAL CHECK VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
] C ] *
] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-401
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-15196X
NASA FMEA #: 1.12.2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
15196
MICROBIAL CHECK VALVE SEAL
LEAD ANALYST : B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
NASA
IOA
[3/2R] [ ]
[3/2R] [P]
C ] [ ]
[P] [p]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-402
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-15197X
NASA FMEA #: 1.13.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
15197
LINES AND FITTINGS (SEALS)
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] C N ] [ N ] C N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-403
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRWEQP-15198X
1.13.2
CREW EQUIPMENT
15198
LINES AND FITTINGS (SEALS)
B. RICHARD
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ ] [ ] [
[ ] [ ] [
C ] C ] [
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW C x ]
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] •
] [ ]
] [ ]
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A RESTRICTED FLOW COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF THE GALLEY. A
DIFFERENCE IN GROUNDRULES ACCOUNTS FOR THE SLIGHT DIFFERENCE IN
THE CRITICALITY RATINGS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-404
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-15199X
NASA FMEA #: 1.14.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
15199
RHS NEEDLE SEAL
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
[3/2R] [ ]
[3/2R] [P]
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-405
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-15200X
NASA FMEA #: 1.15.2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
15200
TEMP GAGE SEAL
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N] [N]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (I.f different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[- ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-406
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-15203X
NASA FMEA #: 1.16.1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
15203
RTD SEAL
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
RECOMMENDATIONS :
C I ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
IN] IN]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
(If different from NASA)
[ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
C
[ ]
[P]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
REMARKS-
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-407
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-15204X
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
15204
WATER HEATER SW ($2)
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ 3 [ ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] •
] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ 3 [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ 3 [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-408
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-15205X
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
15205
OVEN HEATER SWITCH (SI)
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
]
]
]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
RE_:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-409
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-15206X
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
15206
OVEN BLOWER SWITCH (S3)
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
]
]
]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-410
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-15207X
NASA FMEA #: 2.9.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
N_[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
15207
WATER HEATER STRIP HEATER (HRI-HR6)
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-411
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-15208X
NASA FMEA #: 2.10.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
15208
WATER HEATER STRIP HEATER THERMOSTAT SI-S12
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-412
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-15209X
NASA FMEA #: 2.11.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
15209
OVEN STRIP HEATERS (HRI-HR4)
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE:
REMA_:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-413
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-152 IOX
NASA FMEA #: 2.12.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
15210
OVEN HEATER THERMOSTATS (SI-$8)
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY sCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
COXPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-414
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-1521IX
NASA FMEA #: 2.13.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
15211
HOT WATER THERMOSTAT (S13)
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-415
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-15212X
NASA FMEA #: 2.14.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
15212
WIRE HARNESS
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/nmc A 8 C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
COHPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-416
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/02/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-15325X
NASA FMEA # : OWDA-2A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
15325
OWDA SLIDE ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-417
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/02/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-15326X
NASA FMEA #: OWDA-2B
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
15326
OWDA SLIDE ASSEMBLY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST : S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/nmC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-418
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/02/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-15327X
NASA FMEA #: OWDA-2D
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
15327
REHYDRATION NEEDLE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-419
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/02/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST :
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/nmC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
CRWEQP-15328X
OWDA-2E
CREW EQUIPMENT
15328
O-RING
S.K. SINCLAIR
A
[
[
[
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
B C
[ ] C ]
C ] [ ]
[ ] C ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NEW ITEM ADDED DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-420
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/02/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-15329X
NASA FMEA #: OWDA-3C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
15329
SOLENOID VALVE - OWDA
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS.
DISAGREE, HOWEVER, WITH NASA ASSIGNED CRITICALITIES AND ISSUE
WILL BE DISCUSSED WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-421
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/02/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-15330X
NASA FMEA #: OWDA-4A
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CREW EQUIPMENT
15330
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER PRESSURE REGULATOR
S.K. SINCLAIR
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ 3 [ 3 [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ 3
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-422
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/02/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-1533 IX
NASA FMEA #: OWDA-5C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
15331
BYPASS VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS.
RECOMMEND USING IOA CRITICALITY SINCE NASA FMEA DOES NOT CONSIDER
THE WORST CASE OF A LEAK CAUSING THE OWDA TO BECOME INOPERABLE.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-423
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/03/87
ASSESSMENTID: CRWEQP-15332X
NASA FMEA #: OWDA-6C
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
15332
OWDA WATER SELECTION VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
C ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS. NASA
FMEA DOES NOT TAKE LEAK TO WORST CASE CONDITION OF INADEQUATE
WATER FLOW REACHING THE REHYDRATION NEEDLE. LACK OF WATER FOR
REHYDRATION WILL RENDER OWDA INOPERABLE AND IF ALL REDUNDANCY
IS LOST, WILL RESULT IN MISSION TERMINATION.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-424
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-15333X
NASA FMEA #: OWDA-10B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
15333
HOSE ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-425
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-15334X
NASA FMEA #: OWDA-IIB
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
15334
OWDA - ROTARY SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NAsA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-426
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-15335X
NASA FMEA #: OWDA-12A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
15335
OWDA - ON/OFF SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-427
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-15336X
NASA FMEA #: OWDA-6B
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
15336
OWDA - ON/OFF SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-428
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-15337X
NASA FMEA #: OWDA-13A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
15337
OWDA - FILL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-429
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/nmC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
CRWEQP-15338X
OWDA- 13 B
CREW EQUIPMENT
15338
OWDA - FILL SWITCH
S.K. SINCLAIR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-430
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/04/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-15403X
NASA FMEA #: CWDA-17A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
15403
CWDA - CONNECTION TO ORBITER
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-431
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
RECOMMENDATIONS :
[ 3/1R ]
CRWEQP-16409X
TREADMILL IB
CREW EQUIPMENT
16409
TREADMILL QUICK DISCONNECT
S.K. SINCLAIR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
C P ] C P ]
CP] CP]
C ] C ]
c
CP]
C P 3
C ]
(If different from NASA)
[ ] C ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
] [D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
RE__
NASA FMEA CURRENTLY REFLECTS A CIL RANKING FOR THE TREADMILL
DISCONNECTS. IOA BELIEVES IT WILL BE CHANGED TO A NON-CIL
LISTING TO COMPLY WITH A CCB DIRECTIVE.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-432
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-16410X
NASA FMEA #: TREADMILL 8A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
16410
TREADMILL MONITOR BATTERIES
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS.
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-433
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-16512X
NASA FMEA #: 07-1-725101-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT
MDAC ID: 16512
ITEM: CREWMAN OPTICAL ALIGNMENT SIGHT (COAS)
ADJUSTMENT MECHANISM
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE:
REM_:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-434
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-16513X
NASA FMEA #: 07-1-725101-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ASSEMBLY
CREW EQUIPMENT
16513
CREWMAN OPTICAL ALIGNMENT SIGHT (COAS) AFT MOUNT
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMA_ :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-435
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENTID: CRWEQP-16514X
NASA FMEA #: 07-1-725103-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ASSEMBLY
CREW EQUIPMENT
16514
CREWMAN OPTICAL ALIGNMENT SIGHT (COAS) AFT MOUNT
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMA_:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-436
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-16515X
NASA FMEA #: 07-1-725103-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
AS S EMB LY
CREW EQUIPMENT
16515
CREWMAN OPTICAL ALIGNMENT SIGHT (COAS) AFT MOUNT
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
[ ]
COMPARE C / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REM_-
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-437
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-16516X
NASA FMEA #: 07-1-725103-6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BRACKET ASSEMBLY
CREW EQUIPMENT
16516
CREWMAN OPTICAL ALIGNMENT SIGHT (COAS) AFT
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
C ] *
C ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-438
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-16517X
NASA FMEA #: 07-1-725103-7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BRACKET ASSEMBLY
CREW EQUIPMENT
16517
CREWMAN OPTICAL ALIGNMENT SIGHT (COAS) AFT
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 C-439

APPENDIX D
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS
D-1
APPENDIX D
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS
NASA FMEA MDAC-ID FLIGHT ITEM FAILURE MODE
07-1B-SWI-I
07-1B-SW3-1
07-1B-SW6-1
07-1B-SW6-1
07-1B-SW5-1
07-1B-SW5-1
07-1B-SWI-I
JSCI7067B-IA
JSCIT0671B-IA
JSCIT067B-IA
JSCI7067-1A
JSCI7067B-IA
JSCI7067B-2A
JSCI7067B-2A
JSCI7067B-2A
JSCI7067B-2A
JSCI7067B-2A
TUBE CUTTER 6G
TUBE CUTTER 6I
TUBE CUTTER 6A
TUBE CUTTER 6F
TUBE CUTTER 6D
TUBE CUTTER 6D
TUBE CUTTER 6C
TUBE CUTTER 6J
2101 1/1
2103 2/2
2104 2/IR
2105 2/IR
2107 2/IR
2108 2/IR
2109 I/i
2200 1/1
2203 1/1
2204 1/1
2205 i/i
2212 I/i
2300 i/I
2303 1/1
2304 1/1
230_ i/I
2306 1/1
3100 2/1R
3101 2/IR"
3102 2/IR
31o3 2/1R
3104 2/1R
3105 211R
3106 3/IR
3107 3/IR
EVA SLIDEWIRE
ASSEMBLY-SLIDE
EVA SLIDEWIRE
ASSEMBLY-STOP
EVA SLIDEWIRE-
END FITTINGS
EVA SLIDEWIRE
ASMBLY-COTTR PIN
EVA SLIDEWIRE
ASSEMBLY - QD PIN
EVA SLIDEWIRE
ASSEMBLY-SUPPORT
EVA SLIDEWIRE
ERCM TETHER-
SMALL HOOK
ERCMTETHER-CABLE
ERCM SAFETY TETHER-
CABLE ATTACH POINTS
ERCM TETHER-
REEL CASE
ERCM SAFETY
TETHER-"D" RING
WAIST TETHER-HOOKS
WAIST TETHER-HOOKS
WAIST TETHER-NOMEX
WEBBING
WAIST TETHER-NOMEX
WEBBING
WAIST TETHER-NOMEX
WEBBING
TUBE CUTTER CUTTING
WHEEL
TUBE CUTTER CUTTING
WHEEL
TUBE CUTTER
CUTTING WHEEL SLIDE
TUBE CUTTER RATCHET
WHEEL
TUBE CUTTER SMALL
RATCHET ASMB
TUBE CUTTER SMALL
RATCHET ASMB
TUBE CUTTER PAWL
TUBE CUTTER PAWL
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
BREAKS FREE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
FAILS TO OPEN
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
INADVERTENT OPENIN,
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
FAILS TO TEARAWAY
AS DESIGNED
TEARS AT ATTACH
POINTS
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
PHYSICAL BINDING/
JAMMING
PHYSICAL BINDING/
JAMMING
PHYSICAL BINDING/
JAMMING
FAILS TO OPEN/CLOS
FAILS TO REMAIN
OPEN/CLOSE
FAILS TO ENGAGE
NOTCHES
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
D-2
NASA FMEA MDAC-ID FLIGHT ITEM FAILURE MODE
TUBE CUTTER 6L
TUBE CUTTER 6B
TUBE CUTTER 6B
CENTERLINE LATC
CENTERLINE LATC
CENTERLINE LATC
3-POINT LATCH 5
3-POINT LATCH 5
CENTERLINE LATC
CENTERLINE LATC
CENTERLINE LATC
3-POINT LATCH 5
3-POINT LATCH 5
EVA WINCH 3A
EVA WINCH 3G
EVA WINCH 3F
EVA WINCH 3E
EVA WINCH 3F
EVA WINCH 3E
EVA WINCH 3C
EVA WINCH 3B
EVA WINCH 3F
3109 2/IR
3111 2/1R
3112 2/1R
3203 1/1
3204 i/I
3206 I/I
3300 1/1
33Ol 1/1
3302 1/1
3303 i/I
3304 1/1
3306 1/1
3307 i/i
3308 i/I
3400 2/IR
3401 2/IR
3402 2/IR
3403 2/IR
3404 2/IR
3405 2/IR
3406 2/IR
3407 2/1R
3409 2/IR
3413 2/IR
TUBE CUTTER
ROLLER LINK
TUBE CUTTER LRG
RATCHET HANDLE
TUBE CUTTER SML
RATCHET HANDLE
CNTRL LATCH
BYPASS TOOL LATCH
CNTRL LATCH
BYPASS TOOL WHEEL
CNTRL LATCH
BYPASS RATCHET HND
3-POINT LATCH
TOOL RTCHT HANDL
3-POINT LATCH
TOOL HOOK
3-POINT LATCH
TOOL RTCHT WHEEL
3-POINT LATCH
TOOL RTCHT WHEEL
3-POINT LATCH
TOOL RATCHET WHEEL
3-POINT LATCH
TOOL ROLLER SHOE
3-POINT LATCH TOOL
COMPENSATOR
3-POINT LATCH TOOL
ROLLER SHOE
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT
ASMBLY HOOK
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT
ASMBLY RTCHT
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT
ASMBLY RTCHT
EVA WINCH AND MNT
ASM LRG CON HND
EVA WINCH AND MNT
ASM LRG CON HND
EVA WINCH AND MNT
RATCHET HANDLE
EVA WINCH AND MNT
ASMBLY ROPE
EVA WINCH AND
MOUNT ASMBLY ROPE
EVA WINCH AND MNT
ASM RTCHT WHEEL
EVA WINCH AND MNT
ASMMNTG PLATE
FAILS TO OPEN
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
FAILS TO REMAIN
OPEN
PHYSICAL BINDING/
JAMMING
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
PHYSICAL BINDING/
JAMMING
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
PHYSICAL BINDING/
JAMMING
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
FAILS TO REMAIN
OPEN
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
PHYSICAL BINDING/
JAMMING
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
PHYSICAL BINDING/
JAMMING
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
PHYSICAL BINDING/
JAMMING
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
PHYSICAL BINDING/
JAMMING
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
D-3
NASA FMEA MDAC-ID FLIGHT ITEM FAILURE MODE
EVA WINCH 3H 3414 2/IR
EVA WINCH 2D 3415 2/1R
EVA WINCH 30 3416 2/IR
EVA WINCH 3C 3417 2/IR
WINCH ADAPTER 1 3500 2/IR
WINCH ADAPTER 1 3501 2/IR
WINCH ADAPTER 1 3502 2/IR
WINCH ADAPTER 1 3504 2/IR
WINCH ADAPTER 1 3505 2/IR
WINCH ADAPTER 1 3506 2/IR
WINCH ADAPTER 1 3509 2/IR
PRD-5B 3600 2/IR
PRD-2 3601 i/i
3602 2/IR
PRD-3A 3603 2/IR
PRD-5A 3604 I/i
PRD-5A 3605 I/i
PRD- IA 3606 I/1
PRD-5A 3608 i/i
PRD-5A 3612 i/i
PRD-5A 3613 I/i
PRD-5A 3614 1/1
PRD-5B 3615 I/i
PRD-2 3616 i/I
SNATCH BLOCK 2C 3800 2/IR
SNATCH BLOCK 2F 3801 2/IR
EVA WINCH AND MNT
ASM GEARS
EVA WINCH AND MNT
ASM GEARS
EVA WINCH AND MNT
ASM PIP PIN
EVA WINCH AND MNT
ASM ROPE SPOOL
EVA WINCH ADAPTER
ASM ROPE
EVA WINCH ADAPTER
ASM ROPE
EVA WINCH ADAPTER
ASM HOOK
EVA WINCH ADAPTER
ASM ROPE CAM
EVA WINCH ADAPTER
ASM ROPE CAM
EVA WINCH ADAPTER
ASM ROPE PLT
EVA WINCH ADAPTER
ASM ROPE SPL
PRD ASM RATCHET
HANDLE
PRD ASM HOOK
PRD ASM HOOK LATCH
PRD ASM HOOK LATCH
PRD ASM RATCHET
GEAR
PRD ASM RATCHET
GEAR
PRD ASM KEVLAR
WEB STRAP
PRD ASM RATCHET
SHAFT PIN
PRD ASM RATCHET
LATCH
PRD ASM RATCHET
LATCH
PRD ASM RATCHET
ASMRELEASE
PRD ASM RATCHET
ASM RELEASE
PRD ASM HOOK/WEB
CONNECT PIN
SNATCH BLOCK
ASM HOOK LATCH
SNATCH BLOCK
ASM HOOK SWIVEL
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
PHYSICAL BINDING/
JAMMING
FAILS TO REMAIN
ATTACHED
PHYSICAL BINDING/
JAMMING
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
PHYSICAL BINDING/
JAMMING
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
PHYSICAL BINDING/
JAMMING
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
PHYSICAL BINDING/
JAMMING
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
FAILS TO CLOSE
PHYSICAL BINDING/
JAMMING
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
FAILS TO CONTACT
RATCHET WHEEL
FAILS TO CLOSE
PHYSICAL BINDING/
JAMMING
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
FAILS TO OPEN
PHYSICAL BINDING/
JAMMING
D-4
NASA FMEA MDAC-ID FLIGHT ITEM FAILURE MODE
SNATCH BLOCK 2G
SNATCH BLOCK 2A
JSC22453-2A
TUBE CUTTER 6H
PRD-6
07-1-725103-4
07-1-725103-7
3805 2/IR
3807" 2/IR
11216 i/i
13113 2/IR
13620 i/I
16514 2/1R
16517 2/1R
SNATCH BLOCK ASM
HOOK ASM LATCH BLK
SNATCH BLOCK
ASSEMBLY HOOK
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY
TUBE CUTTER PAWL
PAYLOAD RETENTION
DEVICE HOUSING
CREWMAN OPTICAL
ALIGNMENT
CREWMAN OPTICAL
ALIGNMENT
FAILS TO REMAIN
CLOSED
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
RAPID
VENT/EXPLOSION
PHYSICAL BINDING/
JAMMING
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
SEAT FAILS TO
ADJUST UP/DOWN
SEAT FAILS TO
ADJUST
BACK/FORWARD
D-5

APPENDIX E
DETAILED ANALYSIS
This appendix contains the IOA analysis worksheets supplementing
previous results reported in STSEOS Working Paper 1.0-WP-VA87001-
01, Analysis of the Crew Equipment Subsystem, (02 November 1987).
Prior results were obtained independently and documented before
starting the FMEA/CIL assessment activity. Supplemental analysis
was performed to address failure modes not previously considered
by the IOA. Each sheet identifies the hardware item being
analyzed, parent assembly and function performed. For each
failure mode possible causes are identified, and hardware and
functional criticality for each mission phase are determined as
described in NSTS 25206, Instructions for Preparation of FMEA and
CI___L. Failure mode effects are described at the bottom of each
sheet and worst case criticality is identified at the top.
LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle.
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A:
1 = Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 = Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
NA = Not Applicable
Redundancy Screens B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
E-I
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/11/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
11215
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY - BATTERY CELL
TOXIC VENTING
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY
3) BATTERY CELL
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA I ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY
PART NUMBER: 10161-20072-01
B [ ] c [ ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, ELECTRICAL SHORT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AN ELECTRICAL SHORT MAY CAUSE THE ELECTROLYTE TO VENT TOXIC
GASES. THE BATTERIES ARE INSPECTED AFTER EVERY FLIGHT. ONCE A
BATTERY HAS BEEN USED, IT IS REPLACED WITH A NEW ONE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-2
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/11/87
CREWEQUIPMENT
11216
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY - BATTERY CELL
RAPID VENTING/EXPLOSION
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY
3) BATTERY CELL
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: i/i AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
10161-20072-01
CAUSES: INTERNAL SHORT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AN INTERNAL SHORT MAY CAUSE RAPID VENTING OF TOXIC GASES OR
EXPLOSION. PAST EXPERIENCE AND ACCEPTANCE TESTING SHOW NO
FAILURES HAVE OCCURRED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-3
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM •.
MDAC ID:
12/11/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
11217
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT"
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY - THERMOSTAT
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY
3) THERMOSTAT
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
10161-20064-01
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE THERMOSTAT COULD ALLOW THE BATTERIES TO BECOME TOO
HOT. THE BATTERIES COULD VENT TOXIC GAS OR EXPLODE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-4
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/11/8v
CREW EQUIPMENT
11218
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY - THERMOSTAT
FAILS TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY
3) THERMOSTAT
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
10161-20064-01
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE THERMOSTAT COULD ALLOW THE BATTERIES TO BECOME TOO
HOT. THE BATTERIES COULD VENT TOXIC GAS OR EXPLODE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-5
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/11/8_
CREW EQUIPMENT
11219
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY - LIGHT SWITCH
STICKS ON IN TWO BULB MODE
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY
3) LIGHT SWITCH
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
10161-20064-01
CAUSES:
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE BATTERIES WOULD BE DISCHARGED FASTER THAN PLANNED.
HDW/FUNC
_/2R
/NA
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-6
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/11/8 
CREW EQUIPMENT
11220
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY - LIGHT SWITCH
STICKS IN OFF POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY
3) LIGHT SWITCH
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
10161-20064-01
CAUSES:
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF A LIGHT COULD MAKE PERFORMANCE OF TASKS MORE DIFFICULT.
OTHER LIGHTS ARE AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-7
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/11/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
11221
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY - FINGER CONTACT ASSEMBLY
LOSS OF BATTERY POWER TO CIRCUIT
SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIRLEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON
CREW EQUIPMENT
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY
FINGER CONTACT ASSEMBLY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
B [ P ] C [ P ]REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY
PART NUMBER: 10161-20041-02
CAUSES:
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO THE SEQUENCING CIRCUIT MEANS LOSS OF LIGHT
ASSEMBLY FUNCTION. EXTRA LIGHT ASSEMBLY IS AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-8
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/11/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
11222
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY - ELECTRICAL CONNECTOR
LOSS OF POWER TO SEQUENCING CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY
ELECTRICAL CONNECTOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
ST20CI080-02
CAUSES:
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO THE SEQUENCING CIRCUIT MEANS LOSS OF LIGHT
ASSEMBLY FUNCTION. EXTRA LIGHT ASSEMBLY IS AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-9
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/14/sv
CREW EQUIPMENT
11325
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE:
OBS - SIGNAL CONDITIONER - BATTERY CONTACT
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL BIOINSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM
SIGNAL CONDITIONER
BATTERY CONTACT ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
TBD
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF THE BATTERY CONTACT ASSEMBLY WILL MEAN LOSS OF SIGNAL
CONDITIONER POWER AND LOSS OF THE SIGNAL CONDITIONER. THE SIGNAL
CONDITIONER FROM THE SECOND OBS CAN BE USED AS A REPLACEMENT ITEM
BUT LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING USE ON AN IVA CREWMEMBER
CAN RESULT IN A LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-10
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/14/8v
CREW EQUIPMENT
11326
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM: OBS - SIGNAL CONDITIONER
FAILURE MODE: OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) OPERATIONAL BIOINSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM
3) SIGNAL CONDITIONER
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
TBD
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AN OPEN OR SHORT CIRCUIT WITHIN THE OBS SIGNAL CONDITIONER WILL
MEAN THE LOSS OF THE SIGNAL CONDITIONER. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
WHEN THE ITEM IS REQUIRED FOR USE BY AN IVA CREWMEMBER CAN RESULT
IN A LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-II
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/14/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
11327
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OBS - IVA CABLE
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST : S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL BIOINSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM
IVA CABLE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: TBD
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AN OPEN OR SHORTED CIRCUIT WITHIN THE IVA CABLE WILL RESULT IN A
LOSS OF THE OBS. IF THE OBS IS REQUIRED FOR USE ON AN IVA
CREWMEMBER, THE LOSS COULD RESULT IN A LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-12
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/17/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
11433
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM: PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT ARTICULATING SOCKET
ASSEMBLY QUICK RELEASE PIN
FAILURE MODE: CANNOT REMOVE PIN
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT
ARTICULATING SOCKET ASSEMBLY
QUICK RELEASE PIN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R . AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
10159-10035
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
QUICK RELEASE PIN CANNOT BE REMOVED.
DETACHED FROM ARTICULATING ASSEMBLY.
PLATFORM ASSEMBLY CANNOT BE
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, 10155-10035
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-13
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/19/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
12110
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVA SLIDEWIRE CUSHION
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
EVA SLIDEWIRE ASSEMBLY
DEPLOYMENT MECHANISM
CUSHION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY
PART NUMBER:
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES:
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE CUSHION FORMS A PAD BETWEEN THE END FITTING AND THE RADIATOR.
IN THE ABSENCE OF ADDITIONAL DEFORMATION OF THE YOKE/DEPLOYMENT
MECHANISM, THE FAILURE OF THE CUSHION WILL HAVE NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-14
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/18/8v
CREW EQUIPMENT
12214
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ERCM SAFETY TETHER - CABLE THIMBLE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) ERCM SAFETY TETHER
3) CABLE THIMBLE
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON CREW OR VEHICLE SAFETY.
REFERENCES: 10162-10062
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-15
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/02/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
13113
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TUBE CUTTER PAWL
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) TUBE CUTTER
3 ) PAWL
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY
PART NUMBER: SED33101368
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO COMPLETE CUTTING SEQUENCE. FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF
TOOL FUNCTION. USED TO CUT DRIVER TUBES ON PAYLOAD BAY DOOR. IF
UNABLE TO CLOSE DOORS THE VEHICLE IS UNABLE TO DEORBIT. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE AND VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SFOM VOL 15, JSC-20466, SED33101368
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-16
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/02/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
13309
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SAFETY RELEASE
FAILS TO RELEASE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) 3-POINT LATCH TOOL
3) SAFETY RELEASE
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33101327
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SAFETY RELEASE FAILS TO RELEASE. THE CREWMEMBER IS UNABLE TO
(AUTOMATICALLY) SPRING THE TOOL OPEN TO GRAB THE LATCH. HOWEVER,
THE CREWMEMBER CAN RATCHET THE TOOL UNTIL THE RELEASE MECHANISM
BREAKS AND THE TOOL OPENS.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SFOM VOL 15, JSC-20466, SED33101327
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-17
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/02/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
13310
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELEASE SPRING
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) 3-POINT LATCH TOOL
3 ) RELEASE SPRING
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:.
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY
PART NUMBER: SED33101327
] S [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO SPRING TOOL OPEN TO GRAB LATCH.
TOOL UNTIL CONTACT IS MADE WITH LATCH.
CREWMEMBER CAN RATCHET
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SFOM VOL 15, JSC-20466, SED33101327
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-18
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/8v
CREW EQUIPMENT
13418
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY PIP PIN
CANNOT BE REMOVED
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY
PIP PIN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED331015170
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE PIP PIN IS REMOVED ONLY DURING GROUND OPERATIONS AND HAS NO
EFFECT ON ORBITAL OPERATIONS. IT IS BEING ADDED ONLY FOR
COMPLETENESS AND AGREEMENT WITH NASA FMEAs.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SFOM VOL 15, JSC-20466, SED33101570
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-19
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
11/22/8v
CREW EQUIPMENT
13419
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY PIP PIN
CANNOT BE INSERTED
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY
PIP PIN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: " /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY
PART NUMBER: SED331015170
] BC ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PIP PIN IS INSERTED ONLY DURING GROUND TURNAROUND OPERATION.
THIS FALIURE HAS NO EFFECT ON CREW OR FLIGHT OPERATIONS AND IS
INCLUDED ONLY FOR COMPLETENESS IN COMPARISON WITH NASA FMEAs.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SFOM VOL 15, JSC-20466, SED33101570
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-20
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
13420
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM: EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY HOOK
FAILURE MODE: HOOK JAMS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY
HOOK
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED331015170
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MATERIAL DEFORMATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO ATTACH HOOK.
SECURED WITH TAPE.
LATCH CAN BE BENT OUT OF THE WAY AND HOOK
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SFOM VOL 15, JSC-20466, SED33101570
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-21
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
13421
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY HOOK
HOOK JAMS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY
HOOK
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY
PART NUMBER: SED331015170
] B C ] c [ ]
CAUSES: MATERIAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO SECURE HOOK BY NORMAL METHODS.
WITH TAPE.
HOOK CAN BE SECURED
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SFOM VOL 15, JSC-20466, SED33101570
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-22
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/3
13422 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY INTERIOR COIL SPRING
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (BREAKS)
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY
INTERIOR COIL SPRING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED331015170
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO USE AUTOMATIC REEL IN FEATURE.
IN MANUALLY.
CREW STILL ABLE TO REEL
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SFOM VOL 15, JSC-20466, SED33101570
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-23
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/15/8v
CREW EQUIPMENT
13620
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE HOUSING ASSEMBLY
STRUCTURAL FAILURE/FRACTURES
HDW/FUNC
1/i
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE
HOUSING ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: i/i ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY
PART NUMBER: 10163-10063-03
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HOUSING ASSEMBLY BREAKS DURING ENTRY. THE RMS OR PAYLOAD COMES
LOOSE IN THE PAYLOAD BAY WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF RESULTING DAMAGE
TO THE VEHICLE AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE OF THE CREW.
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, 10163-10063
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-24
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/15/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
13621
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE HOOK LATCH
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE
3) HOOK LATCH
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
10163-10063-03
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HOOK LATCH FAILING TO OPEN WILL MEAN LOSS OF TOOL FUNCTION. TWO
DEVICES ARE FLOWN ON EACH FLIGHT PLUS RMS/PAYLOAD JETTISON
CAPABILITY STILL EXISTS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY, HOWEVER, CAN
MEAN LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, 10163-10063
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-25
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
13808
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SNATCH BLOCK ASSEMBLY HOOK LATCH
FAILS TO CLOSE, JAMS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
SNATCH BLOCK ASSEMBLY
HOOK LATCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY
PART NUMBER: SED33102357
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE HOOK LATCH FAILING OPEN WILL HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW
OPERATIONS OR SAFETY. HOOK CAN BE MANUALLY CLOSED OR SECURED
WITH TAPE.
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, SED33012357
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-26
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/19/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
13809
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SNATCH BLOCK ASSEMBLY HOOK LATCH
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
SNATCH BLOCK ASSEMBLY
HOOK LATCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33102357
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HOOK LATCH JAMS OPEN AND THE CREW IS UNABLE TO SECURE THE TOOL.
TAPE OR OTHER MEANS OF SECURING THE TOOL ARE STILL AVAILABLE OR
THE CREW CAN MANUALLY CLOSE THE HOOK.
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, SED33012357
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-27
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/o2/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
15182
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: /
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANUAL SHUT OFF VALVE (MV3)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
s)
CREW EQUIPMENT
GALLEY
WATER SUPPLY
MANUAL SHUT OFF VALVE (MV3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /
LIFTOFF: /
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: /
TAL: /
AOA: /
ATO: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION: GALLEY
PART NUMBER: MV3
A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS VALVE SUPPLIES AMBIENT WATER TO THE HOT WATER LOOP OF THE
GALLEY. IF IT FAILS CLOSED, THERE WILL BE NO HOT WATER FOR
REHYDRATION.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6, GALLEY UPGRADE MODIFICATIONS
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-28
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/02/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
15183
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANUAL SHUT OFF VALVE (MV3)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
GALLEY
WATER SUPPLY
MANUAL SHUT OFF VALVE (MV3)
SEAL FAILURE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION : GALLEY
PART NUMBER: MV3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE SEAL WILL RESULT IN FREE WATER IN THE CABIN WHICH
CAN BE A HAZARD TO OTHER SYSTEMS. THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE LITTLE
EFFECT ON THE OPERATION OF THE GALLEY AND COULD BE CONTROLLED IF
DETECTED BY A CREWMAN.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6, GALLEY UPGRADE MODIFICATIONS
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-29
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/o2/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
15184
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HOT WATER TANK O-RING
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) GALLEY
3) HOT WATER SYSTEM
4) HOT WATER TANK
5) O-RING
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION: GALLEY
PART NUMBER:
A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE O-RING WOULD RESULT IN A SMALL AMOUNT OF FREE
WATER IN THE CABIN WHICH COULD POSE A HAZARD TO OTHER SYSTEMS.
IF CREWMEN CANNOT CONTROL THE LEAK, THE HOT WATER WOULD HAVE TO
BE SHUT DOWN AND WOULD NOT BE AVAILABLE FOR THE REST OF THE
MISSION.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6, GALLEY UPGRADE MODIFICATIONS
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-30
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12102187
CREW EQUIPMENT
15185
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RECIRCULATION PUMP (PI) SEAL
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
GALLEY
HOT WATER SYSTEM
RECIRCULATION PUMP (PI)
SEAL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: GALLEY
PART NUMBER: P1
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE SEAL COULD RESULT IN FREE WATER IN THE CABIN WHICH
COULD POSE A HAZARD TO OTHER SYSTEMS. IF THE LEAK CANNOT BE
CONTROLLED, THE HOT WATER WILL HAVE TO BE SHUT DOWN AND WOULD NOT
BE AVAILABLE FOR THE REST OF THE MISSION.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6, GALLEY UPGRADE MODIFICATIONS
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-31
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/o2/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
15186
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REHYDRATION PUMP (P2)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) GALLEY
3) REHYDRATION STATION PUMP
4) SEAL
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION: GALLEY
PART NUMBER: P2
A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE SEAL WILL RESULT IN FREE WATER IN THE CABIN WHICH
COULD POSE A HAZARD TO OTHER SYSTEMS. CREWMEN SHOULD BE ABLE TO
CONTROL THE LEAK IF IT CAN BE DETECTED.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6, GALLEY UPGRADE MODIFICATIONS
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-32
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/02/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
15187
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COLD WATER RECIRCULATION VALVE (SVl)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) GALLEY
3) RHS WATER SUPPLY
4) SOLENOID VALVE
5) SEAL
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
/ RTLS : /
/ TAL: /
3/2R AOA: /
/ ATO: /
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: GALLEY
PART NUMBER: SVI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL RESULT IN FREE WATER IN THE CABIN WHICH CAN
POSE A _[AZARD TO OTHER SYSTEMS. CREWMEN SHOULD BE ABLE TO
CONTROL THE LEAK IF IT CAN BE DETECTED.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6, GALLEY UPGRADE MODIFICATIONS
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-33
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/o2/8v
CREW EQUIPMENT
15188
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RHS COLD WATER RECIRCULATION VALVE (SV2)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) GALLEY
3 ) WATER SUPPLY
4) BYPASS SOLENOID VALVE
5) SEAL
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: GALLEY
PART NUMBER: SV2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL RESULT IN FREE WATER IN THE CABIN WHICH CAN
POSE A HAZARD TO OTHER SYSTEMS. THE CREW SHOULD BE ABLE TO
CONTROL THE LEAK IF IT CAN BE DETECTED.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6, GALLEY UPGRADE MODIFICATIONS
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-34
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12102187
CREW EQUIPMENT
15189
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RHS OUTLET SOLENOID VALVE (SV3)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
GALLEY
RHS WATER SUPPLY
OUTLET SOLENOID VALVE
SEAL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: GALLEY
PART NUMBER: SV3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL RESULT IN FREE WATER IN THE CABIN WHICH CAN
POSE A HAZARD TO OTHER SYSTEMS. THE CREW SHOULD BE ABLE TO
CONTROL THE LEAK IF IT CAN BE DETECTED.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6, GALLEY UPGRADE MODIFICATIONS
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-35
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/02/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
15190
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RHS CHILLED WATER FEED SOLENOID VALVE (SV4)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
GALLEY
RHS WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM
CHILLED WATER FEED SOLENOID VALVE
SEAL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION: GALLEY
PART NUMBER: SV4
A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL RESULT IN FREE WATER IN THE CABIN WHICH CAN
POSE A HAZARD TO OTHER SYSTEMS. THE CREW SHOULD BE ABLE TO
CONTROL THE LEAK IF IT CAN BE DETECTED.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6, GALLEY UPGRADE MODIFICATIONS
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-36
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/03/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
15191
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: /
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CHECK VALVE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) GALLEY
3) WATER SUPPLY
4) CHECK VALVE
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE CHECK VALVE ALLOWS A FLOW OF HOT WATER THROUGH MV2 TO THE
AUXILIARY PORT. THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE VERY LITTLE EFFECT ON
THE OPERATION OF THE GALLEY AND COULD EVEN GO UNNOTICED.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6, GALLEY UPGRADE MODIFICATIONS
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-37
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/o3/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
15192
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CHECK VALVE
FAILS CLOSED
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: /
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) GALLEY
3) WATER SUPPLY
4) CHECK VALVE
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD PREVENT HOT WATER FROM BEING AVAILABLE TO THE
AUXILIARY PORT BUT WOULD HAVE NO ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE NORMAL
OPERATION OF THE GALLEY.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6, GALLEY UPGRADE MODIFICATIONS
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-38
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
12103187
CREW EQUIPMENT
15193
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CHECK VALVE SEAL
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) GALLEY
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
WATER SUPPLY
CHECK VALVE
SEAL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD RESULT IN FREE WATER IN THE CABIN WHICH COULD
BE A HAZARD TO OTHER SYSTEMS. THE CREW SHOULD BE ABLE TO CONTROL
THE LEAK IF IT CAN BE DETECTED.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6, GALLEY UPGRADE MODIFICATIONS
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-39
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/o3187
CREW EQUIPMENT
15194
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MIXING VALVE (MV2)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) GALLEY
3) WATER SUPPLY
4) MIXING VALVE (MV2)
5) SEAL
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
LOCATION: GALLEY
PART NUMBER: MV2
A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL RESULT IN FREE WATER IN THE CABIN WHICH MAY
POSE A HAZARD TO OTHER SYSTEMS. THE CREW SHOULD BE ABLE TO
CONTROL THE LEAK IF IT CAN BE DETECTED.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6, GALLEY UPGRADE MODIFICATIONS
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-40
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/03/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
15195
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: /
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MICROBIAL CHECK VALVE
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
GALLEY
WATER SUPPLY
MICROBIAL CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE WORST CASE RESTRICTION WILL PREVENT USING THE AUXILLARY PORT.
THE NORMAL OPERATION OF THE GALLEY WILL NOT BE AFFECTED BY THIS
FAILURE.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6, GALLEY UPGRADE MODIFICATIONS
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-41
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/03/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
15196
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM: MICROBIAL CHECK VALVE SEAL
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) GALLEY
3 ) WATER SUPPLY
4) MICROBIAL CHECK VALVE
5) SEAL
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] s[P] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL RESULT IN FREE WATER IN THE CABIN WHICH MAY
POSE A HAZARD TO OTHER SYSTEMS. THE CREW SHOULD BE ABLE TO
CONTROL THE LEAK IF IT CAN BE DETECTED.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6, GALLEY UPGRADE MODIFICATIONS
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-42
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/o3/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
15197
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LINES AND FITTINGS (SEALS)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) GALLEY
3) WATER SUPPLY
4) LINES AND FITTINGS
5) SEALS
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
/ RTLS:
/ TAL:
3/2R . AOA:
/ ATO:
/
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL RESULT IN FREE WATER IN THE CABIN WHICH MAY
POSE A HAZARD TO OTHER SYSTEMS. THE CREW SHOULD BE ABLE TO
CONTROL THE LEAK IF IT CAN BE DETECTED.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6, GALLEY UPGRADE MODIFICATIONS
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-43
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
121o3187
CREW EQUIPMENT
15198
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: /
ITEM: LINES AND FITTINGS (SEALS)
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) GALLEY
3) WATER SUPPLY
4) LINES AND FITTINGS
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE WORST CASE RESTRICTION WOULD PREVENT USE OF THE GALLEY -
OTHER SOURCES OF WATER WOULD HAVE TO BE USED.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6, GALLEY UPGRADE MODIFICATIONS
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-44
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/03/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
15199
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RHS NEEDLE SEAL
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) GALLEY
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
WATER SUPPLY
RHS NEEDLE
SEAL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY "SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL RESULT IN FREE WATER IN THE CABIN WHICH MAY POSE
A HAZARD TO OTHER SYSTEMS. THE CREW SHOULD BE ALBE TO CONTROL
THE LEAK.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6, GALLEY UPGRADE MODIFICATIONS
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-45
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/o3/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
15200
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TEMP GAGE SEAL
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) GALLEY
3) WATER SUPPLY
4) TEMP GAGE
5) SEAL
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION: GALLEY
PART NUMBER:
A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL RESULT IN FREE WATER IN THE CABIN WHICH MAY POSE
A HAZARD TO OTHER SYSTEMS. THE CREW SHOULD BE ABLE TO CONTROL
THIS LEAK IF IT CAN BE DETECTED.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6, GALLEY UPGRADE MODIFICATIONS
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-46
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/o3/8v
CREW EQUIPMENT
15203
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RTD SEAL
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) GALLEY
3 ) WATER SUPPLY
4 ) RTD
5) SEAL
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL RESULT IN FREE WATER IN THE CABIN WHICH MAY
POSE A HAZARD TO OTHER SYSTEMS. THE CREW SHOULD BE ABLE TO
CONTROL THE LEAK IF IT CAN BE DETECTED.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6, GALLEY UPGRADE MODIFICATIONS
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-47
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12103187
CREW EQUIPMENT
15204
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: /
ITEM: WATER HEATER SW (S2)
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) GALLEY
3 ) ELECTRICAL
4) WATER HEATER SWITCH
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: GALLEY
PART NUMBER: $2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORT TO CASE WILL CAUSE CIRCUIT BREAKER TO TRIP.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6, GALLEY UPGRADE MODIFICATIONS
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-48
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12103187
CREW EQUIPMENT
15205
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: /
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OVEN HEATER SWITCH (Sl)
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) GALLEY
3 ) ELECTRICAL
4) OVEN HEATER SW (SI)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: GALLEY
PART NUMBER: S1
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORT TO CASE WILL CAUSE CIRCUIT BREAKER TO TRIP.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6, GALLEY UPGRADE MODIFICATIONS
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-49
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/03/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
15206
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: /
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OVEN BLOWER SWITCH (S3)
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) GALLEY
3 ) ELECTRICAL
4) OVEN BLOWER SWITCH
5)
6)
7)
8)
S)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: " /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION: GALLEY
PART NUMBER: $3
A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORT TO CASE WILL CAUSE CIRCUIT BREAKER TO TRIP.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6, GALLEY UPGRADE MODIFICATIONS
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-50
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/o3/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
15207
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: /
ITEM: WATER HEATER STRIP HEATER (HRI-HR6)
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
GALLEY
ELECTRICAL
WATER HEATER STRIP HEATER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY
HRI-HR6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORT TO CASE WILL CAUSE CIRCUIT BREAKER TO TRIP.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6, GALLEY UPGRADE MODIFICATIONS
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-51
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/03/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 15208 ABORT: /
ITEM: WATER HEATER STRIP HEATER THERMOSTAT SI-S12
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
S)
CREW EQUIPMENT
GALLEY
ELECTRICAL
WATER HEATER STRIP HEATER THERMOSTAT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /'
LANDING/SAFING : /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY
SI-S12
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORT TO CASE WILL TRIP THE CIRCUIT BREAKER.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6, GALLEY UPGRADE MODIFICATIONS
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-52
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/o3/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
15209
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: /
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OVEN STRIP HEATERS (HRI-HR4)
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) GALLEY
3) ELECTRICAL
4) OVEN STRIP HEATERS
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY
HRI-HR4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORT TO CASE WILL CAUSE CIRCUIT BREAKER TO TRIP.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6, GALLEY UPGRADE MODIFICATIONS
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-53
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/o3187
CREW EQUIPMENT
15210
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: /
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OVEN HEATER THERMOSTATS (Sl-SS)
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
s)
CREW EQUIPMENT
GALLEY
ELECTRICAL
OVEN HEATER THERMOSTATS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] S[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: GALLEY
PART NUMBER: SI-$8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORT TO CASE WILL CAUSE CIRCUIT BREAKER TO TRIP.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6, GALLEY UPGRADE MODIFICATIONS
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-54
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
121o3187
CREW EQUIPMENT
15211
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: /
ITEM: HOT WATER THERMOSTAT (SI3)
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
GALLEY
ELECTRICAL
HOT WATER THERMOSTAT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ' ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: GALLEY
PART NUMBER: S13
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORT TO CASE WILL CAUSE CIRCUIT BREAKER TO TRIP.
REFERENCES: ' JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6, GALLEY UPGRADE MODIFICATIONS
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-55
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/o3/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
15212
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: /
ITEM: WIRE HARNESS
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) GALLEY
3) ELECTRICAL
4) WIRE HARNESS
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: , / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WORST CASE FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF GALLEY. ALTERNATE
SOURCE OF WATER WOULD HAVE TO BE USED FOR COMPLETION OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6, GALLEY UPGRADE MODIFICATIONS
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-56
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/02/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
15325
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OWDA SLIDE ASSEMBLY
STUCK IN UP OR DOWN POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) OWDA
3) SLIDE ASSEMBLY
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
SED 48101600
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SLIDE ASSEMBLY IS STUCK IN UP OR DOWN POSITION. CREW IS UNABLE
TO DISPENSE WATER WITH THE OWDA. IF CWDA SUBSEQUENTLY FAILS,
MISSION SHOULD BE TERMINATED.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SFOM VOL 12, JSC-20365, SED48101600
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-57
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/02/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
15326
ITEM: OWDA SLIDE ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER
3) SLIDE ASSEMBLY
HANDLE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
SED48101600
CAUSES: OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HANDLE BREAKS BUT SLIDE ASSEMBLY STILL ACCESSIBLE AND OWDA IS
STILL USABLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SFOM VOL 12, JSC-20365, SED48101600
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-58
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/o2/8v
CREW EQUIPMENT
15327
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REHYDRATION NEEDLE
NO FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER
NEEDLE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
SED48101600
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONTAMINATION OR BENDING PREVENTS WATER FLOW THROUGH REHYDRATION
NEEDLE. IF SPARE NEEDLE AND CONTINGENCY WATER DISPENSER
SUBSEQUENTLY FAIL, THEN MISSION SHOULD BE TERMINATED.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SFOM VOL 15, JSC-20365, SED48101600
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-59
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/02/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
15328
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM: O-RING
FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL/EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER
SLIDE ASSEMBLY
O-RING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
SED48101600
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, DEFECTIVE MATERIAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKAGE FROM THE O-RING MAY RESULT IN A SMALL AMOUNT OF WATER
BEING FREE IN THE CABIN. THE WATER CAN BE CONTAINED BY THE CREW
WITH NO RESULTING DAMAGE OR SAFETY IMPLICATIONS.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SFOM VOL 12, JSC-20365, SED48101600
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-60
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/02/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
15329
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SOLENOID VALVE - OWDA
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER
SOLENOID VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
SED48101600
CAUSES: SEAL DAMAGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DAMAGE TO THE SOLENOID VALVE SEAL MAY ALLOW A SMALL AMOUNT OF
WATER TO LEAK INTO THE CREW MODULE. IF SMALL ENOUGH, THE LEAK
CAN BE CONTAINED BY THE CREW AND THE OWDA WILL REMAIN
OPERATIONAL. HOWEVER, A LARGE LEAK WILL CAUSE THE SOLENOID VALVE
AND OWDA TO BE CONSIDERED BROKEN.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SFOM VOL 12, JSC-20365, SED48101600
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-61
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/02/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/3
15330 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER PRESSURE REGULATOR
REGULATES HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER
3) PRESSURE REGULATOR
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: _ /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
SED48101600
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SPRING BREAKS, MECHANISM JAMS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WATER PRESSURE AND DELIVERED FLOW RATE ARE INCREASED. CREW CAN
USE A LOWER VOLUME SETTING OR THE BYPASS VALVE TO CONTINUE
OPERATION OF THE OWDA.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SFOM VOL 12, JSC-20365, SED48101600
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-62
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/02/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
15331
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BYPASS VALVE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER
BYPASS VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
SED48101600
CAUSES: SEAL DAMAGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DAMAGE TO THE BYPASS VALVE SEAL WILL CAUSE A LEAK INTO THE CREW
MODULE. IF THE LEAK IS SMALL ENOUGH THE WATER CAN BE CONTAINED
BY THE CREW AND THE OWDA WILL REMAIN OPERATIONAL. HOWEVER, IN
THE WORST CASE, THE LEAKAGE WILL CAUSE A REDUCTION IN THE
WATER DELIVERED TO THE CREW AND NON-OPERATION OF THE OWDA. LOSS
OF ALL WATER DELIVERY REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN MISSION
TERMINATION.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SFOM VOL 12, JSC-20365, SED48101600
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-63
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/03/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
15332
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OWDA WATER SELECTION VALVE
INTERNAL/LEAKAGE VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER
WATER SELECTION VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: _NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
SED48101600
CAUSES: SEAL DAMAGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DAMAGE TO WATER SELECTION VALVE SEAL MAY ALLOW WATER TO LEAK INTO
THE CREW MODULE. IF THE LEAK IS SMALL, THE WATER CAN BE
CONTAINED BY THE CREW AND THE OWDA WILL REMAIN OPERATIONAL.
HOWEVER, A WORST CASE LEAK WILL RESULT IN INSUFFICIENT WATER
REACHING THE REHYDRATION NEEDLE AND AN INOPERABLE OWDA. IN THIS
CASE, LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN MISSION TERMINATION.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SFOM VOL 12, JSC-20365, SED48101600
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-64
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/o3/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
15333
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HOSE ASSEMBLY
INTERNAL/EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER
HOSE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
SED48101600
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, DEFECTIVE MATERIAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A LEAK IN THE LINE GOING FROM THE ORBITER WATER SUPPLY TO THE
OWDA WILL RESULT IN WATER IN THE CABIN AND AN INOPERABLE OWDA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES IN THE WATER DELIVERY SYSTEM WILL RESULT IN
MISSION TERMINATION.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SFOM VOL 12, JSC-20365, SED48101600
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-65
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12103187
CREW EQUIPMENT
15334
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OWDA - ROTARY SWITCH
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER
ROTARY SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
SED48101600
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE OWDA ROTARY SWITCH FAILS TO A GIVEN POSITION WHICH WILL
PERMIT ONLY ONE QUANTITY OF WATER TO BE DELIVERED. THE OWDA IS
STILL OPERATIONAL BY USING THE BYPASS VALVE.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SFOM VOL 12, JSC-20365, SED48101600
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-66
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/o3/8v
CREW EQUIPMENT
15335
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OWDA - ON/OFF SWITCH
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER
ON/OFF SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
SED48101600
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM THE ON/OFF SWITCH MEANS THE OWDA CANNOT BE
OPERATED IN ITS NOMINAL MODE. THE BYPASS VALVE AND THE
CONTINGENCY WATER DISPENSER ARE STILL AVAILABLE. HOWEVER, THE
MISSION MUST BE TERMINATED FOR LOSS OF ALL WATER DELIVERY
REDUNDANCY.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SFOM VOL 12, JSC-20365, SED48101600
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-67
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/o3/8v
CREW EQUIPMENT
15336
ITEM: OWDA - ON/OFF SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAILS ON
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER
ON/OFF SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
SED48101600
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE ON/OFF SWITCH FAILS ON WHICH RESULTS IN THE OWDA BEING
CONTINUOUS POWERED. THIS CAN CAUSE INADVERTENT ACTIVATION BUS NO
SAFETY CONCERNS.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SFOM VOL 12, JSC-20365, SED48101600
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-68
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
121o3187
CREW EQUIPMENT
15337
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM: OWDA - FILL SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
S)
CREW EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER
FILL SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: SED48101600
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE OWDA FILL SWITCH FAILS OPEN, THE "AUTOMATIC" FEATURE OF
THE REHYDRATION CYCLE WILL NOT OPERATE. THE BYPASS VALVE AND THE
CONTINGENCY WATER VALVE ARE STILL AVAILABLE. MISSION TERMINATION
WILL BE REQUIRED IF ALL WATER DELIVERY REDUNDANCY IS LOST.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SFOM VOL 12, JSC-20365, SED48101600
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-69
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
121o3187
CREW EQUIPMENT
15338
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OWDA - FILL SWITCH
FAILS CLOSED
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER
FILL SWITCH
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
/NA RTLS: /NA
/NA TAL: /NA
3/2R AOA: /NA
ATO: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: SED48101600
S [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE OWDA FILL SWITCH FAILING CLOSED WILL RESULT IN NO WATER FLOW
AFTER THE INITIAL WATER PULSE WHICH OCCURRED WHEN THE BUTTON
FAILED. THE BYPASS VALVE AND THE CONTINGENCY WATER DISPENSER ARE
STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SFOM VOL 12, JSC-20365, SED48101600
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-70
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12104187
CREW EQUIPMENT
15403
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CWDA - CONNECTION TO ORBITER
UNABLE TO MAKE CONNECTION
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
CONTINGENCY WATER DISPENSER
CONNECTION TO ORBITER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
SED48101607
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO CONNECT CWDA TO ORBITER WATER SUPPLY. THIS MEANS THE
CWDA WILL NOT PROVIDE WATER TO THE CREW. IF ALL REDUNDANT
METHODS OF WATER DELIVERY ARE LOST, MISSION TERMINATION WILL BE
REQUIRED.
REFERENCES: JSC-20365, SED48101607
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-71
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/lO/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
16409
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TREADMILL QUICK DISCONNECT
JAMMED/FAILS TO RELEASE
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) TREADMILL
3) QUICK DISCONNECT
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: 10131-10031-02
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT REMOVE TREADMILL FROM: (i) LI OH DOOR FOR REINSTALLATION
OF CREW SEAT; (2) MIDDECK FORWARD FLOOR TO ACCESS LOCKERS WITH
CRITICAL EQUIPMENT.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SFOM VOL 12, 10131-10031
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-72
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/lO/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
16410
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TREADMILL MONITOR BATTERIES
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), DEPLETED POWER
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
TREADMILL EXERCISER ASSEMBLY
PHYSIOLOGICAL MONITOR
BATTERIES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
10131-10031
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE TREADMILL'S PHYSIOLOGICAL MONITOR WILL BE INOPERATIVE DUE TO
LOSS OF BATTERY POWER. TREADMILL WILL STILL FUNCTION WITHOUT
MONITOR.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SFOM VOL 12, i0131-10031
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-73
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/11/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/IR
16512 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
MECHANISM
FAILURE MODE:
CREWMAN OPTICAL ALIGNMENT SIGHT (COAS) ADJUSTMENT
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
COAS
ADJUSTMENT MECHANISM
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-74
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/11/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/3
16513 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE:
CREWMAN OPTICAL ALIGNMENT SIGHT (COAS) AFT MOUNT
SEAT FAILS TO ADJUST UP OR DOWN
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) COAS
3) AFT MOUNT ASSEMBLY
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-75
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/11/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 2/IR
16514 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE:
CREWMAN OPTICAL ALIGNMENT SIGHT (COAS) AFT MOUNT
SEAT FAILS TO ADJUST UP OR DOWN
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) COAS
3) AFT MOUNT ASSEMBLY
4)
5)
6)
_)
B)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER:
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-76
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/11/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/3
16515 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
AS S EMB LY
FAILURE MODE :
CREWMAN OPTICAL ALIGNMENT SIGHT (COAS) AFT MOUNT
SEAT FAILS TO ADJUST BACKWARD AND FORWARD
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) COAS
3) AFT MOUNT ASSEMBLY
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-77
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/11/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/IR
16516 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE:
CREWMAN OPTICAL ALIGNMENT SIGHT (COAS) AFT BRACKET
SEAT FAILS TO ADJUST UP OR DOWN
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
COAS
AFT BRACKET ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-78
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/11/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 2/IR
16517 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE:
CREWMAN OPTICAL ALIGNMENT SIGHT (COAS) AFT BRACKET
SEAT FAILS TO ADJUST BACWARD AND FORWARD
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
S)
CREW EQUIPMENT
COAS
AFT BRACKET ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/12/88 E-79

_PPENDIX F
NAS_ FHEA TO IOA WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE/RECOHNENDATIONS
This section provides a cross reference between the NASA FMEA and
corresponding IOA analysis worksheet(s) included in Appendix E.
The Appendix F identifies: NASA FMEA Number, IOA Assessment
Number, NASA criticality and redundancy screen data, and IOA
recommendations.
Appendix F Legend
Code Definition
1 IOA recommends deleting the IOA failure mode.
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